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1 INTRODUCTION 
Although the word geopolitics was anathema after the Second 
World War because of its connection with National Socialism and 
German expansion policy, geopolitical considerations and 
geopolitical behaviour were apparent in almost all countries. The 
whole policy of containment adopted towards the Soviet Union 
was nothing more than a clear geopolitical construct, and the 
Soviet Union had developed its own mirror image of this setting. 
Slowly the expression became employable once again, but now 
in the more restricted sense of the competition between the two 
superpowers. The U.S. Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, 
defined geopolitics in the late 1970's as an approach that pays 
attention to the need for a balance of power (between the 
superpowers).' 
Territorial control was once an essential part of geopolitics, 
but now global economic forces, international organizations and 
the vast networks of interaction between individuals and groups 
are becoming increasingly independent of the boundaries 
between states. Does this mean that geopolitics belongs to 
history, or can we still perceive evidence of its existence? If we 
can, how does it affect foreign policy in our corner of the world? 
What actually is geopolitics, how it was practised in the past and 
what will be its characteristic features in the future? 
Dr. Osmo Tuomi is a former naval officer (Captain), whose last 
appointment was Chief of Operations at Naval Headquarters. He has studied 
military sciencies in the Swedish War College and political sciencies at the 
Helsinki University. At present he works in business life and is an independent 
researcher. 
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The present paper aims to provide answers to questions of 
this kind. Its first aim is to analyse the old theoretical and 
methodological tenets of the discipline and regularities in the 
development of geopolitical behaviour. Secondly, it arrives at a 
new definition of both theoretical and practical geopolitics by 
analysing the features of the old geopolitics that are still relevant 
and the most important changes that have taken place in the 
forces influencing the relations between societies and space. The 
third part describes the influence of the "new geopolitics" at both 
the global and the regional level in the context of different 
scenarios of the world system, with the emphasis on Europe, and 
especially on the security policy consequences for Northern 
Europe. This is done against the background of recent political 
and economic trends in the main regions of the world, with the 
purpose of showing that any major geopolitical world order will 
be reflected in the position of the northern subregion of Europe. 
After the break-up of the bipolar world system, political 
theories have been in a state of uncertainty. There is no single 
theory capable of explaining and predicting changes in world 
politics or the political behaviour of societies, and consequently 
the world can be observed through several alternative 
perspectives and decisions are often made under the influence of 
contradictory motives. This study provides the observer with a 
geopolitical perspective on processes currently taking place in the 
world system. It does not deny the merits of other viewpoints, 
which are usually based on integration theories and stress 
common interests and global interdependence, but its thesis is 
that geopolitical considerations still have an impact of their own. 
Much of the theoretical material in this publication is dealt 
with more thoroughly in the author's doctoral thesis (in Finnish): 
New Geopolitics: The Feasibility of the Geopolitical Perspective 
for the Study of International Politics in a Changing World (1996). 
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2 THEORIES IN THE PAST 
2.1 Old understandings of geopolitics 
Geopolitics has had many features in common with political 
realism. Both of these approaches to international relations have 
assumed that the main actors on the global scene are states, and 
that the economic, military and other capacities of these states 
are crucial in determining whose goals will be realized. But 
whilst realism regarded power as a means as well as an end, the 
old geopolitics stressed the influence of objective geography on 
the spatial division of the world in that it could be assumed to 
constrain and directing the activities of states. In the most 
extreme of the old theories almost all occurences in international 
politics were seen as derived from geography, and the critical 
parameters and concepts included those of location (Lage), space 
(Rautu), territorial control, power projection, sphere of influence, sphere 
of interest, accessibility and buffer zone. Even today geopolitics is 
commonly understood as a discipline which deals with the 
influence of geographical space on the politics of a state.2 
Geopolitics is not far removed from political geography, and 
the terms are sometimes used as synonyms. But there is a 
difference, as there also is between geopolitics and geostrategy. 
The French "Fondation pour les Etudes de Defence National" 
(FEDN) tries to clarify these three concepts in the following way. 
Political geography describes the rise and actions of political forces 
in a spacial context, geopolitics presents the spatial situation in the 
form of texts, articles and governing principles, and implicitly or 
explicitly signals the direction which policy should take, and 
geostrategy is the military and political strategy or course of action 
adopted to achieve the geopolitical ends.3 
It is characteristic of geopolitical images that there is 
assumed to be at least latent competition between the states and 
regions of the world. The hypothesis put forward here is that 
such competition will continue to prevail in the future, for 
reasons to be explained later, but that the causes of the existence 
of competing regions and their distribution cannot be derived 
from geography alone. Instead, one has to consider all the 
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national, international, regional and local forces that are acting to 
mould the political landscape and the geographically bounded 
decisions of states and other territorial societies and unions. 
2.2 The birth of global geopolitics 
Geopolitics and geopolitical behaviour in a modern sense 
developed amongst the Great Powers at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, and most especially in Germany, the United 
States and Russia, all of which were experiencing a period of 
rapid growth. In Germany, an idealistically based national unity 
was being propounded as a means of attaining prosperity and 
greater influence in Europe, while in the United States and Russia 
geopolitical considerations constituted justifications and goals for 
their period of expansion. These considerations were developed 
in the course of the nineteenth century into doctrines of internal 
growth and the extension of influence beyond the country's own 
national borders, and finally into global geopolitical theories. It 
should be noted that geopolitical thinking grew up in a period 
characterized by great changes in power relations, and especially 
in those countries that were actively engaged in improving their 
status. 
In Germany the phase of unification and growth was 
preceded by the work of several influential writers and 
philosophers. David von Billow predicted in 1799 that there 
would be a trend in Europe towards a few large, strong states, 
while the small ones were doomed to disappear. A strong nation 
such as the Germans had to control a unified area surrounded by 
natural boarders (Naturgrenzen) which were easy to defend. The 
German nation should take control of the whole Danube area, 
for instance, and thus isolate Russia and Turkey from each other. 
A balance of this kind would favour lasting peace in Europe.' 
Johan Gotlieb Fichte (1762-1814) recommended a unified 
Germany under the leadership of Prussia, and this Germany 
should protect itself from commercial competition, which was the 
reason for inequality and war. He combined Machiavellian 
realism with national idealism, which also included a concept of 
individual liberty and social equality. His writings, especially the 
book "Der Geschlossene Handelsstaat", provided inspiration for 
the National Socialism of the present century. 
E:j 
Friedrich List (1789-1846) maintained that a sea power such 
as England would profit from a liberal trade policy. The only way 
to compete against it was to create a vast, strong, industrialized 
Germany under a protectionist system. The first step would be a 
German customs union and later a coalition of the continental 
states. List predicted that the United States would later be the 
dominant sea power, and that the world would be divided into a 
Pan-America and a Pan-Europe, the latter led by Germany. 
England would finally be forced to co-operate with Europe, and 
Germany and England together would rule even the Asian and 
Pacific areas. The development of railways was an essential 
condition for continental unification and expansion.5 
Geopolitics in Russia and America was based on theoretical 
considerations to a lesser degree than that in Germany, for the 
arguments and concepts were developed while the expansion 
was already in progress. The extension of Russia's boundaries 
was carried out by military force and coercion. There were 
different opinions regarding the main geographical direction, but 
a common feature was perhaps a tendency towards coastal areas. 
Several influential writers recommended that Russia's centre of 
gravity should be moved eastwards. Railways should be built in 
order to be able to exploit the Pacific coast and to compete with 
western countries on the Chinese market. They would also serve 
as means to control the vast area and to Russify its most 
important regions.6 
Justification for the expansion was sought in geographical 
facts. It was natural for the whole Eurasian plain to be under one 
command, and Russian settlers were needed to spread 
civilization among the barbaric peoples of Asia. The possession 
by Russia of its own religion, the idea of the "difference" between 
Russia and the western nations and the Slavophile concept 
tended to provide an ideological background whenever the 
boarders of Russia were drawn. Feodor Dostoyevski was highly 
influential in emphasizing the uniqueness and mission of Holy 
Russia. Russia is not part of Europe as many people in the west 
think, it simply has a European appearance.' 
In the United States, economic growth and the increase in 
the European population created an atmosphere which was 
favourable for notions of an American empire. President Thomas 
Jefferson in particular spoke up in favour of an Empire, separate 
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from Europe, that would represent liberty, welfare and a 
difference relative to other countries. The vast continent and its 
hidden resources should be taken in into use, exploration was 
favoured, and the Pacific coast was seen as the natural boarder of 
the country in the west.$ The geopolitical concept of the Western 
Hemisphere was created in connection with the Monroe doctrine in 
1822, when the president declared, that all European attempts to 
extend their political systems to the new continent were to be 
considered a threat to the United States. A period of vigorous, 
bellicose expansion in the middle of the century gained its 
ideological justification from the idea of a Manifest Destiny, in 
which the white Americans were destined to spread democracy 
and human rights across the whole continent. 
Economic growth was founded on mercantilism and 
protectionism, and the country was bound together with a 
railway network. The United States was considered to represent 
values and qualities that would attract neighbouring islands and 
continental areas.9 Since the 1860's the USA has emphasized its 
exceptionally peaceful brand of imperialism and the 
attractiveness of its own virtues. 
2.3 Anglo American theories and their influence 
A global maritime doctrine was first put forward by Alfred T. 
Mahan, whose work "The Influence of Sea Power upon History" 
(1890) was greatly appreciated among the political and military 
elites in both the United States and England. He perceived the 
key to global leadership in control over the lines of 
communication at sea and over world trade. A favourable 
geographical location with good harbours was a necessary 
condition.10 He combined the idea of commercial expansion with 
the necessity to reinforce the naval power of the United States, 
and regarded the area from China to the Mediterranean, the 
Middle Strip, as commercially important. He strongly 
recommended the construction of the Panama Canal and the 
acquisition of various Pacific islands situated on the route from 
the USA to China and Southeast Asia. There is clear evidence that 
Mahan's ideas influenced the American policy of expansion, and 
special attention has been drawn to their influence on the 
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thinking of Presidents McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt. Even 
the Senate debated over Mahan's ideas." 
The most famous geopolitical writer of all was Sir Halford 
Mackinder, who published the central idea of his theory in a 
discourse and an article "The Geographical Pivot of History" in 
1904. This theory views world history is a continuous struggle 
between land power and sea power, between the horsemen of 
the steppes and the seafaring people of the surrounding insular 
world. The land power is situated in the fulcrum of the Eurasian 
continent, the pivot of history. The pivot region could become a 
major sea power if Germany were to ally herself with Russia. He 
advocated that the maritime powers, including France, should 
join forces and lead Germany to adopt a continental course, and 
away from the temptation to turn eastwards.12 
Fig. 1. Mackinder's world in 1919 
Mackinder later gave his Pivot of History the title Heartland. 
After the First World War he included Eastern Europe, the Baltic 
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Sea area and the Black Sea in the Heartland, and suggested that a 
strong continental power could use these seas to develop a 
capacity fit to challenge the sea power globally. Command of 
Eastern Europe was a key factor for dominance of the Heartland. 
Russia had been the central power there up to that time, but 
Mackinder saw a real danger in form of an eventual alliance 
between Russia and Germany.13 
Consequently, Mackinder advised the peace negotiators at 
Versailles to separate Germany and the Soviet Union with a 
buffer zone of independent states to prevent the rise of a 
powerful Heartland. Poland should have a guaranteed access to 
the Baltic Sea, because the buffer must be complete. A number of 
politicians shared Mackinder's opinion, and a buffer zone was 
created. The British prime minister, Lord Curzon, considered 
such a zone necessary to separate the maritime British world 
from the continental areas dominated by Russia.14 
During the Second World War there was an "unholy 
alliance" between the maritime powers and the Soviet Union. Old 
geopolitical arguments were still used to motivate the people. In 
the United States it was important to convince the nation that the 
Western Hemisphere extended to Western Europe, and 
Mackinder then described the North Atlantic area as the 
"Midland Ocean", which in time became a geographical 
framework for the "Atlantic Alliance".15 Mackinder's influence 
continued after the war. Opinion has it that either Mackinder's 
ideas were totally outdated but his notion of "Heartland" was 
exploited to serve other political goals, or else that Mackinder 
did not create the Cold War strategy but that this state of affairs 
in any case brought certain of his theses to the fore." The 
Department of State Bulletin in 1964 nevertheless recognized that 
whatever the case might have been, the whole containment 
policy of the United States was inseparably tied up with 
Mackinder's thesis as presented at the Royal Geographical 
Society 60 years earlier." 
The pictures espoused by the national security advisor, 
Zbigniew Brzezinski, in 1986 are very similar to that of 
Mackinder in 1919, leading President Ronald Reagan to put 
matters in the following way: "The first historical dimension of 
our strategy is relatively simple, clear cut and immensely 
sensible. It is the conviction that the United States most basic 
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national security interests would be endangered if a hostile state 
or group of states were to dominate the Eurasian land mass, the 
area of the globe often referred as the world's heartland..." 
Another famous geopolitical writer during the Second 
World War, Nicholas Spykman, developed upon the ideas of 
Mackinder. In his opinion the key to world dominance lay in the 
rich rim of the Eurasian continent that acted as a buffer between 
the Heartland and the maritime powers. It was in the American 
national interest to prevent the unification of this rim under one 
command. He saw that the Japanese and German spheres of 
influence had to be eliminated, but these countries should not be 
destroyed entirely, as they were needed to resist the predicted 
expansion of the Soviet Union after the War.18 Balanced power 
relations should be created between the European countries, and 
Germany, which would still have the greatest power resources 
should be counterbalanced with France and Eastern Europe.19 
Plans were conceived at the end of the war to make Germany a 
scattered farming federation (the Morgenthau Plan), but 
geopolitical considerations revived in the spirit of Spykman 
turned opinion towards restrengthening the country. 
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2.4 Theories and practice in Germany 
German geopolitical thinking since the end of the nineteenth 
century has been nurtured by fear of a closed location and a 
preoccupation with the sufficiency of the nation's living space. 
Two schools, Welt politik and Lebensraum, came into existence. The 
adherents of the former recommended colonialism, world trade 
and a strong navy, while the latter called for a strong position in 
Europe and saw the natural direction for expansion to be in the 
east. The Lebensraum school proved the stronger, although both 
had some influence in practice. 
It was a political geographer, Friedrich Ratzel, who created 
the concepts used later in geopolitical theories. He wrote about 
the organic nature of states, by which he meant that growth and 
movement were natural phenomena. All human societies 
struggle with the outside world to ensure an independent life for 
themselves. Small societies are obliged to join together into larger 
units, and a global movement is in operation which is 
transforming the whole world into one huge economic organism. 
The whole energy and tenacity of a nation is needed to preserve 
its cultural and political independence in the face of this 
movement towards concentration.2° 
The best known representative of German geopolitics 
between the world wars was the General and Professor Karl 
Haushofer. He maintained that states were engaged in a 
competition for Lebensraum, and that growth depended on 
possessing the capacity to absorb one's smaller neighbours. 
Natural borders had to be favoured in each phase of the 
expansion. The great aim of geopolitics was a reasonable division 
of the Lebensraum of the whole world. Geopolitics should 
provide a basis for the exercise of political skill.21  
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Fig. 3. Pan areas, according to Haushofer (Strategic Atlas, Penguin Books 1985). 
Haushofer was influenced by Mackinder. A state that could 
dominate Europe should be capable of extending from the Rhine 
to the Urals, and accordingly Haushofer saw the Slavic nations 
as potential allies. Since self-sufficiency was important, 
Haushofer predicted that the world would develop towards 
three pan-areas, Pan-America, Pan-Eurafrica and Pan-Asia, the 
self-sufficiency of which would be guaranteed by their size and 
the fact that they extended to all climatological zones.22 
The relation between geopolitical theories and the conduct 
of the foreign policy of the Third Reich was a dual one, in which 
some theoretical considerations were accepted and others 
disregarded. The German leadership adopted the following ideas 
from the theoreticians: 23 
- 
	
	Germany's security should be based on a strong Central 
Europe. The threats posed by France and the Soviet 
Union should be eliminated and the whole German 
speaking population should be united. 
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- The border of Germany in the west should be moved 
westwards to "Naturgrenen", and it should also 
correspond to geopolitical facts. 
In the east, Germany should dominate and reorganize 
Eastern Europe. 
The geopoliticians had an impact on policy up to the 
beginning of 1939. They published an influential magazine, 
"Zeitschrift fur Geopolitik", and Karl Haushofer was a personal 
friend of Rudolf Hess. Public opinion was influenced by maps, 
writings, radio programmes and press comments originating 
from the geopouticians,24 and Hitler's "Mein Kampf" made use 
of a number of half digested ideas and concepts taken from the 
geopoliticians, e.g. that of Lebensraum.25 But in 1939 the party 
began to implement its own policy, and finally Karl Haushofer 
was arrested several times and the Zeitschrift was suppressed. 
Haushofer had recommended an alliance with the countries of 
Eastern Europe, including the Soviet Union, whereas Hitler had 
planned an alliance with Britain against Russia. The "Molotov-
Ribbentrop agreement" on spheres of interest, signed on 
22.8.1939, and the neutrality agreement with Japan and the Soviet 
Union of 13.4.1941 seemed to be following the "geopolitical 
path". But only two months after the latter agreement Germany 
launched its attack eastwards. Arguments that sounded 
geopolitical were used to justify the engagement on two fronts, 
but in this, as in many other cases, Hitler's ideological illusions 
surpassed the theoretical results. 
2.5 The geopolitical character of Russia and the Soviet Union 
During the Soviet regime ideology denied the influence of 
geography on societies. Geopolitics was defined as a tool of 
imperialism, and use of the word "Eurasia" was banned in 
political and historical connections. A short exception to this rule 
was the Eurasian movement led by Pyotr N. Savitsky in the 
1920's, which stressed the uniqueness of Eurasia and the 
importance of creating a continental economic area of this kind 
that was almost independent of trade in the maritime world. 
Some exchange was still thought advantageous, however, and 
therefore a harbour was needed on the Persian Gulf, for 
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instance.26 The ideas of self sufficiency and the need for harbours 
lived on even after the fall of the movement. 
After the Revolution communism became a formal 
legitimization of the old geopolitical behaviour. The empire 
strove for internal growth and strengthening of its power by 
centralized rule, until the focus of politics turned outwards. The 
construction of railways continued, mainly according to plans 
dating from the previous century. The coastal areas were bound 
together by a canal system that first connected the Baltic Sea with 
the White Sea and the Caspian Sea and was finally completed in 
1952 with the Volga-Don canal that gave access to the Sea of 
Azov. The access to the oceans was considered important in order 
to enhance the economy, stimulate scientific research and 
facilitate connections with friendly countries.27 Geopolitical 
behaviour was militarily inclined. After the Second World War a 
sphere of influence was created in Central Europe to serve 
Russian economic and military interests. This zone provided for 
both forward defence and the concentration of invasion troops. 
As a whole the history of Russia and the Soviet Union is 
considered to furnish empirical evidence of "realistic" geopolitics 
in which power, distance and expansion are connected. 
Whenever the country has been strong, it has pushed its borders 
and spheres of influence outwards, while in periods of weakness 
it has retreated from its more remote areas.28 
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3 GEOPOLITICAL BEHAVIOUR 
3.1 Phases of geopolitical conduct 
In the light of historical evidence it is possible to construct a 
model to demonstrate how geopolitical thinking and behaviour 
develop. As a starting point it can be assumed that there exists a 
certain geopolitical world order, but that power relations begin 
to change due to uneven economic growth, technical break-
throughs, political upheaval or the break-up of an empire. The 
situation becomes unstable and the system starts to change. In 
the first phase all the countries affected by the change have to 
redefine their positions to match the new situation or new 
expectations, in other words they have to determine their new 
place relative to other countries. The geographical dimension of 
this sense of position is often called a geopolitical code, which 
means a subjective comprehension of one's location (quarter, 
region, reference group) and direction of interests, goals, 
possibilities and threats. In Germany the code was a leading 
position in Central and East Europe and the right to 
"Lebensraum", while in the USA it was this country's "mission 
and destiny" on the American Continent. Geopolitical behaviour 
has often been based more on the ideological component of the 
geopolitical code than on economic or strategic realities. 
In the second phase, countries improving their positions 
have normally promoted internal growth in order to strengthen 
their economic and other capabilities. This means such things as 
industrialization programmes, exploitation of the resources of the 
whole country, communication networks from the perspective 
of the centre and protection of one's own economy. The goal is to 
become competitive, or stronger than one's competitors. 
The third step is to unify the country culturally, or at least 
create a community spirit. This is a prerequisite for success in the 
face of economic, political or military competition. Any increase 
in influence always needs a cause that the majority of the people 
can accept. In the examples described earlier, the cause was 
nationalism (Germany), the orthodox-slavonic "differences" 
(Russia) or liberty and democracy (USA). Among other 
ideologies that expanding states have deliberately used are Islam 
(the Ottoman Empire), catholicism (Spain), the Habsburgian 
heritage (Austria) and the enlightenment (France).29 Symbols of 
the ideology are created: great temples or dominant official 
buildings, flags and other emblems. The different cultures within 
the regime are fused or assimilated to the dominating one, and 
internal borders are dissolved and outer ones strengthened. An 
atmosphere of "different from and better than the Others" has to 
be created. The great powers in particular want to appear as 
defenders of a good cause and to believe that they are promoting 
a better and safer world." 
If resources allow, the fourth phase is geographical 
expansion or enlargement of the country's spheres of influence 
and interest. This can be accomplished with the aid of economic 
benefits and sanctions (attraction), political and ideological 
propaganda (Anschluss) or political and military power 
(coercion). A common feature has been a striving towards natural 
boarders and lines of marine communication.31  
Change of 
power Relations 
New geo- 	Renewal of geo- 
political order 	political codes 
Geopolitical conduct 
- Internal growth 
- cultural unification 
- expansion of power 
and influence 
Fig. 4. Phases of geopolitical behaviour 
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The goal of the extension, either access and exploitation or 
power and influence, often determines the means adopted. 
France had the latter in mind when expanding and acquiring 
colonies, and consequently subjugated the new areas directly 
under its own administration and promoted the French language 
and culture. Britain, on the other hand, was mostly aiming at 
trade and economic benefits, and therefore often contented itself 
to cooperation with local governments or rulers.32 
3.2 Motives and arguments for the mastering of space 
The manifestations mastery over living space are political 
authority, economic dominance and military control. All these 
form part of geopolitics, given that there is a geographically 
defined target. The goals for mastery are either preservation of 
one's own regime or expansion of dominance and influence, and 
the reason behind it is a feeling that mastery and control are 
linked to prosperity and influence. Consequently such thoughts 
seldom exist without there being heavy pressure for a state to 
surrender part of its territory. Rudolf Kjellen, one of the fathers 
of geopolitics, wrote that its easier for a state to give up human 
lives than possessions.33 
Is expansion a "natural" part of a state's behaviour? At least 
the tendency appears in various guises. In many regions there is 
a pure, realistic tendency to grow at one's neighbour's expense. 
On the other hand, democratic, industrialized countries often use 
political and economic means to secure their interests. If there is 
expansion, it becomes apparent in increased political influence, 
economic dependence or control over social values. Generally 
speaking a propensity for growth — in numbers, value, area, 
quality — is well rooted in all human societies. Companies want 
to become bigger, to capture a larger share of the market or to 
branch out into new markets. 
There are theories that try to explain this desire with regard 
to the state: (1) Marxist theories that link imperialism with 
capitalism, implying that the state is furthering the interests of 
the owners of capital by securing trade and investments in 
foreign markets, (2) theories grounded in about nationalism, 
which consider that the vital energy of the nation state almost 
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automatically turns towards expansionism, and (3) theories that 
set out from persistent features of human nature.34 
It has been said that power in politics is the equivalent of 
money in the economy. One can extend this comparison in the 
following way. The maximizing of profits and market shares is a 
common goal in economics, but it is an ambition that is often 
attenuated because of a lack of resources, fear of counteractions 
or restrictions and regulations imposed by society. In the same 
manner a political society may suppress its expansive tendencies 
because of limited resources, a fear of reactions from other 
societies, international agreements or common interests. 
What, then, are the justification offered for territorial 
control? Peter Slowe lists five sources of political power behind 
such control: might, right, nationhood and ethnicity, legality and 
hegemonic legitimacy.35 We add a sixth reason to this list, one 
which is by no means new but is especially applicable to modern 
trade blocs: economic necessity. 
Might means the direct, unconcealed pursuit of power and a 
leading local, regional or global position. Lying behind it there 
may still be the image of an organistic nation state, with the 
assumption that it is natural for a successful state to grow and 
achieve dominance. The most desirable areas are those with 
natural resources or good communications. The personal 
ambitions of a state's leaders can also propel it towards 
dominance by might. Positions of this kind exist nowadays 
chiefly in the Third World. 
Right means the mobilization of people who believe that 
their society is entitled to a certain territory and status. The 
feeling of justification can be very persistent, as in Northern 
Ireland or the Middle East. Both England and Argentina still 
consider that they have a right over the Falkland Islands / Islas 
Malvinas, and there are numerous comparable cases all over the 
world, e.g. around China. 
The power vested in nationhood and ethnicity has been very 
influential. A nation state is strong human society which can 
effectively mobilize its resources, whilst a state as such is no more 
than a legal entity. A nation state can under certain circumstances 
demand expansion on the pretext of national unity. 
The legality aspect focuses on the borders between legal 
units. The signatories to treaties often have different opinions 
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about the legality, relevance and mutual significance of these 
documents. The United Nations has been trying in recent times 
to solve the claims over sea areas and the sea bed according to 
legal principles, but with only partial success, and there are many 
legal disputes still running, a good example of which is the 
ownership of the islands and waters in the South China Sea. 
Hegemonic legitimacy refers to the acceptance of power 
differences as a fact which gives special rights to powerful states. 
In Finland, President Paasikivi spoke at length in the 1940's and 
1950's about the legitimate interests of the Soviet Union. 
Hegemony would not be possible without tacit acceptance of this 
legitimacy. The United States has actively adopted the role of a 
world power with special duties and rights to maintain order, 
and most other states acknowledge this. 
Economic necessity has accounted for geopolitical expansion 
even in the past. Mahan recommended expansion one hundred 
years ago on the grounds of the growth in production in the 
United States.31 Nowadays there is a general opinion that national 
economies are too small for global competition. It is only within 
large common markets that it is possible to sustain welfare and 
successful competition. Similarly it is said that the control of 
economic forces is possible only within a wide area that also has 
a political dimension. At the same time, general security would 
be enhanced by creating a common foreign and security policy 
and a common defence. 
3.3 Relation between theories and practice 
A dual relation exists between theoretical models and reality. 
One question is how well a theory describes the real world, and 
the critics of geopolitics have concentrated on this aspect, 
especially on the coarse simplification of the real world that this 
entails. This question will be dealt with in the next chapter. The 
other question is how the theories influence political decisions, 
examples of which were presented in Chapter 2. These examples 
mainly described circumstances in which a theoretician had 
direct contacts with the political elite or commanded vast support 
through his writings, but there are also cases where an influential 
politician himself has created geopolitical images and 
expressions. Such figures have included President Theodore 
Roosevelt, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and the national-
security advisors Zbigniew Brzezinski and Anthony Lake. In 
Chile, President Augusto Pinochet had been Professor of 
Geopolitics at the War Academy and had himself published a 
book entitled "Geopolitica" (1974). It is often difficult to establish 
a direct liaison between theory and practice, but the existence of 
a geopolitical world of ideas, as a result of impacts from many 
sources, is still evident. A state and its leadership normally 
embrace a geopolitical code or a geographical framework in 
which they address matters of foreign policy.37 Those responsible 
for major decisions have a subjective picture of the world in 
mind, a mental map,38 and this does not only concern the 
leadership, as national discussion of foreign policy is limited in 
general by a socially accepted hegemonic geopolitical view which 
is influenced and maintained by the media, e.g. by popular 
publications like the Readers Digest.39 Theories can have an 
important indirect influence on this process. 
A third kind of relation between theory and practise is the 
use of geopolitical or semigeopolitical expressions and 
arguments for propaganda purposes, to conceal the real objects 
or to make acts of policy acceptable. Germany before and during 
the Second World War is a good example of this, but certainly 
not the only one. 
3.4 Criticism of the old geopolitics and changes in world 
politics 
Geopolitical theories were already subjected to much criticism in 
the period between the two world wars, on the grounds that they 
attributed the most important activities of states solely to certain 
fixed geographical conditions and that they compared states with 
living organisms, employing biological and physical phrases 
such as 'heart', 'nerves' and 'power lines' (Kraftlinien).40 This 
whole concept was later described as useless, as meaning either 
everything or nothing in terms of world politics. 
Several books and articles have been published in recent 
years that can be grouped together under the heading of "critical 
geopolitics", the findings of which must be taken into account 
when analysing geopolitics as a science. All in all, this criticism 
focuses mainly on the way in which the complexity of the world 
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was reduced to a simple bipolar picture, with no input of genuine 
geographical information. "Exhortations about heartland 
substituted for real human geography, in its messy complexity. 
The result, most spectacularly in the case of the United States, 
was a foreign policy driven by simplistic visions of containment 
and domino reasoning rather than a comprehensive grasp of the 
complexity of regions and places".41  
Other reviewers note that geopolitical descriptions are 
always selective and differ from the facts. Geography is not used 
objectively, apart from ideology and politics, but becomes part of 
the power discussion. Some scholars would like to abandon the 
whole idea that the influence of geography in politics could 
assessed objectively, and have suggested that geopolitics should 
be defined in terms of discursive analyses of how the situation is 
maintained and legitimized by the rhetoric and policy of a few 
core powers.42 
The relevance of geopolitics has become even more 
questionable since the recent changes in world politics and 
economics. First of all, the ideological, political and military 
confrontation between East and West has ended as such, making 
the respective geopolitical models irrelevant. But this does not 
mean that other kinds of area-bound descriptions of the world 
system are useless. One geopolitical world order has always been 
followed by another. The big question of today is in that of how 
the military alliances, economic blocs and political communities 
will take shape and where they should extend. 
John Lewis Gaddis makes sense when writing about 
American policy, in that he maintains that in order to recognize 
American interests in the present world, the first thing one needs 
is a geopolitical map.43 Henry Kissinger points out that the 
geopolitical containment doctrine was clear and understandable, 
but now, when "enlargement of democracy" has been presented 
as an alternative to containment, it remains unclear what this 
means in practice. "Whom does it imply we should support? 
With what means? Over what period and at what risk?"4' 
The second major difference relative to the situation in the 
past has been the gradual development of relations between the 
western industrialized nations. The probability of an all-out war 
between the Western European countries, for example, within a 
predictable period of time is commonly estimated to be close to 
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zero. There are several explanations for the futility of any such 
war. One is supranationalism and a feeling of community 
between people living in different welfare states, i.e. the people 
simply could not be motivated to make war on each other, and 
another argument is that the costs of any conquest would vastly 
exceed the gains to be made form it. The benefits of an imaginary 
expansion are already available now, or can be achieved by other 
means.45 These arguments must be taken into consideration when 
defining the geopolitics of today, but they still do not remove the 
element of competition pursued by other means, nor are they 
valid for other parts of the world. 
The third profound development in the world system 
concerns the nature of economics, in two senses. One is the 
internationalization of economics, the fact that states have more 
or less lost control over economic forces now that the obstacles to 
trade and the movement of capital have been lifted. As 
geopolitics has been concerned with the state, it is widely 
believed that one of the main reasons for geopolitical behaviour 
has disappeared as well. This view is actually part of the 
"pluralistic paradigm", which denies the dominant influence of 
the state in other respects, too. This challenge to geopolitics will 
be discussed later. 
The second economic aspect stresses the significance of 
technology and education rather than spatially bound material 
resources. This "new growth theory" maintains that the increase 
in labour and capital explains only a small part of economic 
growth, and that the main contributory factors are technical 
progress and human capital. Ideas and innovations cross borders 
and knowhow moves rapidly between growth centres. The 
possession of a large territory would thus not be a very tempting 
goal for a state. Japan and Germany are often mentioned as 
examples of countries with a small area coupled with high 
capacity and substantial influence. 
The notion of the diminishing importance of size is true, but 
only to å certain extent, possession can be replaced with assured 
access. Both of the above mentioned countries had a great interest 
in financing the Gulf War. Improvements in technology are 
mainly aimed at material production, and material growth is still 
dependent on access to natural resources and locations. The 
availability of raw materials, energy, labour, transport and 
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marketing areas are all unevenly distributed, in in this sense 
geography still matters. The "rims" of the continents are 
commonly the most prosperous areas in the world and within 
individual countries, and non-material growth parameters are 
also concentrated in these areas, together with high quality 
production. Some of these growth centres straddle national 
boundaries. This provides a hint that competition, and along with 
it new patterns of geopolitics, may be partly taking shape 
between areas other than states. 
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4 THE CONTENT 
OF THE NEW GEOPOLITICS 
4.1 Definition 
It is essential that a new species of geopolitical thinking should 
take note of the valuable insights provided by the critics. The old 
theoretical views of an eternal confrontation between Sea Power 
and Land Power are no longer defensible, for there are several 
other possible scenarios for future competition between 
geographical areas. The fact that such competition is inescapable 
will be demonstrated later. 
The notion of an overwhelming impact of geography on 
politics must be rejected, and account must be taken of all the 
main forces that influence the formation of spatially bounded 
political units and their mutual relations. Geography exerts 
mainly an indirect influence on this. One theory maintains that 
physical geography largely determines economic geography, 
which in turn regulates social geography, which in turn 
influences politics.46 The parameters on which geography 
influences economics are distances, lines of communication, 
accessibility, transport costs, subjective ideas on the ease of 
intercourse between given places and the aggregation of 
economic activities,47 and these same parameters also have a 
direct impact on politics when they are evaluated for the 
purposes of economic and military planning. 
Secondly, the argumentation behind the recent changes 
indicates that the old geopolitical approach must be renewed in 
many other ways, too. First of all, we must remember that 
societies that are smaller or larger than nation states, may also act 
geopolitically in the future. Transnational or multinational 
societies developed by economic and political integration may 
commit their participants to mutual cooperation, 
interdependence and solidarity, thereby reducing their internal 
tensions. But when such integration aims at increasing their 
influence and strengthening their competitiveness relative to 
other comparable entities, geopolitical behaviour can be 
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expected, the perceptibility of which depends of the harshness of 
the competition. One prerequisite for a geopolitics of this kind is 
that the political dimension of the entity should be "large 
enough". Another change, the diminishing role of power politics 
and the use of military force between western democracies, must 
similarly be taken into account, as must the increasing 
importance of trade policy and other economic considerations. 
In other parts of the world, however, straightforward power still 
matters, and the struggle for physical, areal control is continuing. 
It has been correctly pointed out that geopolitical images are 
subjective, so that each of the states or other actors will behave in 
accordance with its own perceptions. In spite of this, theoretical 
geopolitical research striving at objective results can be useful. 
Therefore suggestions that geopolitics can be defined only in 
terms of discussion are unacceptable. Instead, we have to 
distinguish theoretical geopolitics, studying both measurable and 
estimated parameters for boundaries between geopolitical units, 
from practical behaviour, which is based on the individual 
picture of the world embraced by each political actor. 
With these aspects in mind, geopolitics can be defined in a 
new way to corresponding to the conditions of the contemporary 
world. 
Theoretical geopolitics studies the relation between physical space and 
international politics, develops models for the spatial division of the 
world into cooperating and competing parts for historical, economic and 
political reasons, and analyses how the participants interpret the 
political, economic and military consequences of this division. 
Geopolitical behaviour in the real world can be defined in 
the following way: 
The geopolitics of a state or other territorially defined society means its 
pursuit of geographically dimensioned aims that are connected with its 
economic and political position, security and culture. 
To make it shorter, 
Theoretical geopolitics is the study of spatial political division, its causes 
and effects. Practical geopolitics refers to the interpretation of the 
world's division into competing political and economic entities and to 
the advancement of space related objects. 
The actors are states, smaller societies and larger unions with 
"enough" of a political nature, and a set of forces are recognized 
that mould the geopolitical world system in addition to the 
indirect influence of physical geography, the most important of 
these being political, economic and cultural forces. 
4.2 Political forces 
One major question is whether foreign policy and national 
interests still matter, or are we moving towards a pluralistic 
world which is no longer directed by the power of states but by 
complex social movements. It has been aptly pointed out that 
there are threats that cannot be resolved with force but need 
cooperation instead. But the pluralistic view goes further than 
that. It describes the world as a network of actors which are 
interdependent on each other, so that the state is only one among 
the multitude of such actors. It is also claimed that their economic 
interdependence is so great that an independent economic policy 
is not possible, or that national economies will soon cease to 
exist.48 The opposite view is that there is no real challenge to the 
present world system based on nation states, nor any indication 
of what could succeed this system.49 
If a pluralistic state of affairs were to prevail, there would 
not be much space for geopolitics either. The supporters of this 
argument believe that free trade has removed all endeavours 
towards supremacy. This argument has been raised in various 
forms at least since Norman Angeli published his work "The 
Great Illusion" in 1911, but it fails to recognize that neo liberalism 
and the ideology of market access economics are based on control 
over territories and interactional flows. World trade has in fact to 
be steered in order to create and sustain a well operating network 
and common rules, and so far this has not been successful 
without territorial control, while conversely the tendency 
towards territorialism is often a result of economic competition, 
development having led to a situation in which sustaining of the 
network has taken up a disproportionally large share of the total 
effort.5° Nation states and the forms of international regulation 
created' and sustained by them still have a fundamental role in 
governing the economy." 
Neo liberalism claims that the markets reward the most 
efficient and punish the slothful, but in reality the end result is a 
coercive hierarchy of "greater" and "lesser" states and regions 52 
The differences in income level between the rich and the poor in 
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terms of both individuals and places continue to widen on a 
global basis. Spatially organized political control is therefore 
necessary to give security for individual people and to protect 
empowering communities. It is not appropriate to leave these 
tasks to market forces, and ideas of a global society are as 
utopistic as ever. Where the necessary authority should be 
housed, is a matter currently under discussion, but it can be said 
in any case that all the time the nation state or some other kind of 
political entity is the institution which gives physical and other 
security in an unsafe world, and the institution with which 
people can identify themselves, political forces and the political 
goals of territorial societies will continue to exist. 
A related question concerns the usefulness of military force 
in a world which has a multitude of mutual connections. The use 
of violence is truly outdated concept in relations between the 
western countries, which form a "security community" of their 
own, but it would be a common mistake to conclude that a high 
percentage of foreign trade or foreign investment within the BNP 
leads as such to peaceful relations.53 The real reason is the 
similarity in the values upheld by these countries and their 
democratic regimes.54 In other connections, however, the use of 
military force by the western democracies is still highly probable. 
These countries have important global interests, mainly economic 
ones, which they will be prepared to defend with force if needed. 
The real reasons for the intervention by the western world in the 
Gulf War were the maintaining of world trade and the assuring 
of a flow of oil. At the regional and subregional levels the use of 
force may even be easier after the retreat of the two superpowers 
than it was before. A strong global hegemony or a global contest 
has often emerged in conjunction with a lack of regional 
supremacy. Now, after the collapse of the bipolar world, a contest 
for regional domination is arising, e.g. in East and South Asia, 
and an arms race is going on there. There are now 100 times more 
weapons in Africa than there were forty years ago.55 
1 Which of these views, the political state centred one or the 
pluralistic one, predominates in the real world? Increased 
interdependence and the establishment of democratic regimes 
are factors which have softened the geopolitical behaviour of the 
highly industrialised countries in their mutual relations, but the 
opposite trend is often evident in many parts of the world. The 
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reason for the first of these trends does not lie naturally or 
automatically in the globalization of economies and the increase 
in trade, but in conscious political decisions to remove the 
obstacles to cooperation. Hence a reversal would also be possible. 
At a time of negative growth, and if basic national interests were 
endangered, these countries could be tempted to give precedence 
to their own interests, which in turn would make their 
geopolitical behaviour more visible. Serious internal disturbances 
and a retreat from the democratic ideal could also effect a change 
in this respect. 
It is evident that competition between states is partly being 
replaced by competition between economic blocs, which could 
potentially develop into political blocs. Whether these blocs 
could, now or in the future, be treated as geopolitical entities is a 
matter that will be considered later. Borders are still important, 
as seen from the fact that the drawing of these in the "right" 
places has been the main problem in the area of the former 
Yugoslavia. Likewise, political dissension between Japan and 
Russia over the Kuril Islands is seen as a serious obstacle to 
cooperation. 
National or alliance-centred political territorial goals are still 
visible even in Europe, where the extension of NATO and the EU 
on the one hand and the status of Russia and the existence of its 
sphere of interest on the other are key questions. The moves to 
enlarge NATO and the EU are aimed at expanding the zone of 
established democracy in Europe, but at the same time they are a 
matter of prestige and power. The element of competition for 
influence in the expansion of NATO and the EU's endeavour for 
greater political and economic weight are clearly discernible. The 
geopolitical features of Russian thinking are commonly 
recognized, but western aspirations are often viewed solely as 
unambitious steps towards promoting security. 
4.3 Economic forces 
The global economic order can be looked at from two 
perspectives. It can be perceived either as an independent 
network without any notable political control, or as an interaction 
between national economies. The first view is connected with the 
neo-liberalist ideology and the latter with protectionism and neo- 
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mercantilism.56 The difficulty lies in the fact that current political 
leaders mostly espouse the former view but have to take more or 
less overt measures in accordance with the latter in order to 
provide security for their citizens. The Nobel prize winners in 
economics in 1993 and 1966, respectively, Douglas North and 
James Mirrlees, were concerned about the problem of how to 
achieve effective markets and at the same time attenuate the 
drawbacks of the modern economy. The belief that the markets 
are always right or that everything will be arranged provided the 
state does not interfere is nonsense in their opinion, but there are 
also lot of unnecessary regulation. An ideal mixture still does not 
exist anywhere. 
The question of free trade or protectionism is crucial to the 
art of geopolitical behaviour and the degree to which it is 
practised. Nations have resorted to protectionism in the course 
of history when consolidating their power, but as their capacity 
to compete has grown, they have changed their stance in favour 
of free trade, which has resulted in softer geopolitical behaviour, 
with power, coercion and possession giving way to influence, 
attraction and access. 
The United States created the present free trade regime in 
order to keep the western countries united against the Soviet 
Union. It was not an economic question in the first place but a 
political one.57 The system still prevails, and is controlled by a 
hegemonic structure consisting of the United States and other 
states, institutions and organizations that advocate a similar 
policy.5 ' Now the global economy is altering power relations and 
giving rise to new kinds of territorial societies and spatial 
settings. States, economic blocks and regions compete to offer 
high-level training and education, low wages and social benefits, 
low taxation, good infrastructure, large internal markets, good 
access to external markets etc. The present economic conditions, 
mixed with political aspirations, tend to favour continent-sized 
economic blocs that are able to sustain competition among their 
industries. It should be remembered, however, that this trend is 
the outcome of innumerable individual profit calculations that 
do not take much account of social or environmental costs or of 
real transport costs, while the communications infrastructure is 
mainly provided by the taxpayers. Since there exists no optimum 
size for a production site, company or market, the result depends 
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on the bounds within which the calculations are performed and 
which costs are included. 
The benefits of the free trade system are currently under 
discussion. Organizations like the OECD or WTO and the 
western governments are commonly of the opinion that the 
resulting growth more than compensates for the drawbacks of 
free trade, and that some people and some regions should make 
sacrifices in order to guarantee a better future. People themselves 
are less mobile than money, goods and ideas, however, and the 
majority of the world's population are unable to move about in 
response to temporary changes in the economy. Thus an OECD 
publication warns that one should not underestimate the 
possibility that governments may be forced to give up the 
economic and social benefits of interdependence and to adopt 
protectionism or an isolation policy.59 
The reasons for the eventual change in attitudes cannot be 
discussed in detail here, but its sources could include regional 
inequalities in development, instability caused by movements of 
capital, collapse of the financing system based on expectations, 
imbalances in trade or a rise in international crime. The U.S. Vice-
President Al Gore stated at a GATT meeting in 1994 that the 
whole trading system will be bound to collapse if it is impossible 
to get people all over the world to support it. 
The competition between states and economic blocs would 
obviously become more open if protectionism were to prevail, 
for the only option for a society under such circumstances would 
be to develop its own economic capacities under the protection 
of its internal markets. If the consistent features of geopolitical 
behaviour described earlier were to be repeated, this would mean 
efforts towards cultural unification, territorial extension or the 
expansion of spheres of influence in order to provide each 
economy with the largest possible base. In the light of changes in 
attitudes and the development of information channels, control 
over territories outside one's own borders would be based not on 
military might but mainly on economic means. Large economic 
blocks would secure their vital interests with military power, 
however, even outside their own boarders, as has already be 
seen, and if the blocks were unable to cope will their uneven 
internal spatial development, they would break up into smaller 
units. 
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4.4 Culture 
It would be a serious mistake to consider that the future spatial 
division of the world will be a result of political aspirations and 
global economic forces alone. Culture is and will be one of the 
autonomous fields of international politics and also an arena of 
competition. The ability of a culture to create favourable rules 
and institutions for international relations is an important source 
of power,60 and global interdependence and the emphasis on 
culture or ethnicity stand in an inverse ratio one to another. The 
internationalization and movements of people, information, 
goods and services often creates a reaction in the form of a 
tendency towards cultural autonomy." 
The highest level of cultural identity is the civilization, of 
which 7 or 8 major examples can be distinguished in the world. 
Some researchers, such as Samuel Huntington, consider 
civilizations and cultural differences to be the most important 
factors in the shaping of future geopolitical divisions. World 
history is more a history of civilizations than of states, and the 
main source of conflicts in the future will not be economics or 
political ideology but culture.62 In this last respect Huntington is 
drawing conclusions for which there is no clear evidence. A clash 
of civilizations is not inevitable, but culture is one of the main 
instigators of different geographically distributed societies and 
can be invoked to mobilize people behind political objects. 
According to Johan Galtung, the coherent technique of writing, 
oriental religions and stress on collectivism are such significant 
cultural features in East and South-East Asia that they may lead 
to the establishment of the most populous coalition in the world. 
Galtung sees cultural differences as especially persistent in 
Europe, where they still assiduously follows the borders that took 
shape in the 11th century between Catholicism and Orthodoxy 
and between Christianity and Mohammedanism. The fronts in 
the Cold War were situated in the wrong place from a cultural 
point of view, forcing Poland and Hungary into the camp of the 
Orthodox world, which is why the disintegration of the Warsaw 
Pact began in these countries.63 The language barrier, a new "Iron 
Curtain" between east and west in Europe, is now stronger than 
it has ever been since the Second World War. For example, 90% 
of all translations from foreign languages into Finnish are made 
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from English, Swedish, German or French originals, and only 1% 
from Russian ones. This has effects on the world of ideas in all 
fields of life.64 The differences between Northern and Southern 
Europe have led to suggestions of a Northern Block of EU 
members, and it was earlier customary in the Nordic countries to 
point out the differences between their values and those of other 
European countries. 
Culture is related to the economic system. Asian ways of 
trading are quite different from those in Europe, Japanese 
regulatory structures being imitated to a large extent in the other 
Asian countries. The relations between government, company, 
family and individual are based on Confucian and other oriental 
codes of ethics,65 whereas the whole of western capitalism grew 
up in protestant soil. Thus even the adaptability of Russia to a 
western economy is a dubious matter. There is a strong Russian 
opinion that it is absurd and socially dangerous to borrow an 
economic model that does not fit the cultural, mental and moral 
values of the people.66 
Culture and politics are as likewise interrelated. Being aware 
of the great effect of culture, politicians use it to promote their 
goals. It is true, as has been pointed out, that a cultural identity is 
a created image, but there is an interface with reality, the images 
are not remote from the real world. Geopolitically, culture has 
been used to extend a nation's sphere of influence, using a 
kindred minority in a neighbouring country as a good excuse to 
apply pressure. Culture can also be an obstacle to political 
aspirations. Minority cultures in specific regions of one country 
can interfere with unity and often restrain the full exploitation of 
resources. The means of achieving uniformity have varied from 
brute force to gentle assimilation, internal immigration and the 
construction of communication systems from the perspective of 
the centre are frequently used methods. The same targets, 
uniformity and effective use of resources to achieve 
competitiveness, are also part of the modern economic system. It 
is just that slightly different slogans, such as free movement of 
labour, a multicultural society and flexibility, are used. 
A common ideology and a coherent culture are important 
for every society, and they would be important even for the 
European Union. There are many answers to the question of what 
is really European culture. The Hudson Institute has concluded 
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that the type of social policy accepted in Western Europe may be 
the only common feature differentiating its way of life from the 
American way. Another opinion is that there is a European 
cultural identity that consists of a partially shared historical 
heritage and experience in the widest possible sense, but that is 
does not serve as a blueprint for the EU.67 The differences 
between the nations currently make the union difficult to govern 
and are a hindrance to the free movement of labour. From the 
economic point of view this is a disadvantage relative to the 
United States, which can deal better with the detrimental 
consequences of uneven regional growth. Since the EU members 
differ a great deal in their political cultures, and will do so even 
more after the next enlargement, it is hard to imagine how they 
could ever attain coherence.68 It is no wonder, therefore, that EU 
tries to promote "European" values and European culture rather 
than "western" culture. Culture was and still is a crucial factor 
for the consolidation of political power and influence. 
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5 THE PRESENT WORLD SYSTEM 
AND THE CHARACTER 
OF THE NEXT CHANGE 
5.1 A hegemonic world 
The present situation can best be described as a "world of one 
superpower", although there are other features present as well 
and the hegemony is by no means absolute. The competition 
between the land power and the sea power described by 
Mackinder and Spykman has at least temporarily been resolved 
in favour of the sea power, that is to say the United States and its 
allies. The position of the United States is based on its political 
and economic power, which according to the old geopolitical 
thinking is the result of a favourable maritime location. 
The U.S. Secretary of Defence stated in his annual report for 
1994 that the United States is the ruling force in the world, with 
the strongest defence, the largest economy and a dynamic, multi-
ethnic society. American leadership is looked for and respected 
in all parts of the world.69 An essential part of this world picture 
is that other nations acknowledge the leading position of the 
United States, its interests in the world and its decisive role in 
NATO, which is incontestably the most significant military 
alliance. American troops in Europe will be kept at a level of 
100 000 men for the present, and the United States is also 
committed to maintaining have an equal force in the Far East. 
This leading position accords well with the American culture and 
ideology. Americanism has from its birth been a transnational 
movement, and the founding fathers already believed that it was 
America's destiny to spread a liberty that derives its origins from 
democracy. Associated with this belief was the myth of equal 
possibilities for everyone and a quasi-religious feeling that riches 
and power were given for use in a certain mission.7° 
Under the principles set out above, it is the leading power 
that has the greatest vested interest in protecting the free trade 
regime. This model leads us to the conclusion that the United 
States is working for global free trade by means of its structural 
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power, but that it is also ready to use economic and military 
resources together with its allies to achieve its goals. The ruling 
coalition secures its economic interests, especially in important 
market areas, nodes of the communications network and areas 
rich in oil and raw materials. 
On the global level, the geopolitical behaviour implied in the 
One Superpower model follows the "soft" lines of the new 
geopolitics. The world system is relatively coherent, but power is 
unevenly distributed. The significance of different parts of the 
world is dependent on their value for the functioning of the 
global system. There is only moderate economic competition 
between the pan-areas, and there are no territorial disputes 
between them. The liberal paradigm is predominant, leading to a 
high level of interdependence and to a subordination of historical 
and cultural features to economic interests. On the regional and 
subregional levels free trade is altering the power relations and 
creating competition, which outside the democratic, 
industrialized nations assumes the form of the "old" nationalist 
geopolitics with aspirations of dominance, expansion and the 
formation of spheres of interest. 
This geopolitical world order will remain dominant, 
however, only so long as the United States has superior resources 
and is willing to maintain the system and honour its own 
commitments abroad. There is no permanent stability in the 
world. The relative power of the United States has decreased, and 
scenarios differing from the One Superpower model have been 
seriously considered. There are opinions that the declining share 
of the USA in the world economy was already initiated in the 
1970s, when the gold standard was abolished, economies were 
weakened by the oil crises and the Vietnam War came to an end. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union also meant that countries such 
as Germany and Japan lost some of their motive for integrating 
their policies with those of the United States. 
At the same time it must be noted that the political will 
within the United States to interfere in matters abroad has 
diminished and its military organization is being reduced in size. 
The U.S. troops were still virtually at their Cold War strength 
during the Gulf War, but the country is now committed to 
designating an ever increasing proportion of its forces in the 
future to controlling regional crises. This will render the decision- 
making process more difficult and reduce the country's readiness 
to intervene in non-vital areas. The reduction in the numbers of 
bases and depots will further detract from the U.S. forces' ability 
to react in a crisis. Even though they may remain the most 
effective forces in the world, their relative weight will diminish 
when China, India, Iran, the ASEAN countries and even Japan 
upgrade their defences. 
Future changes in power relations can also be expected to 
reduce the structural hegemony of the United States. Germany, 
Japan and possibly some other countries will acquire more 
influence in the United Nations, and U.S. participation in regional 
organizations and in the upper structures of world trade will 
contract.71 In the light of these assertion it is justifiable to explore 
alternatives to the One Superpower world. 
5.2 The next geopolitical change 
A central question from a geopolitical point of view is whether 
the present trend towards freedom of trade and other liberties 
will continue or whether protectionism and the tightening of 
competition between pan areas, regions or states will take over. 
If the free trade regime prevails for some time, there may then be 
a period of transition to another kind of hegemony. 
Hegemony does not necessary mean the supremacy of one 
single nation, in fact for most of our history it has been difficult 
to point out any clear dominance. But the system is unlikely to be 
an anarchic one; more probably hegemony will be vested in the 
operations of international organizations. J. Agnew and S. 
Corbridge describe this as a "cultural complex of practices and 
representations associated with a particular geopolitical order 
without the requirement of a dominant territorial agent". In their 
usage, "(geopolitical) order refers to the routinized rules, 
institutions, activities and strategies through which the 
international political economy operates in different historical 
periods".72 The rules express the nature of the geopolitical order, 
and they are always politically accepted through agreements or 
similar behaviour on the part of the leading powers. It is these 
rules that determine the importance and status of countries, 
territories and regions. 
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In fact there are already signs of a geopolitical order 
emerging of the kind described above. A very influential forum 
for the major industrialized powers is the G7 group, the decisions 
of which affect the whole global economy. This group, which has 
sometimes been placed on the level of a Holy Alliance, was 
initially founded only on purely economic considerations, but at 
the United States' initiative it has come to deal more and more 
with political and geopolitical matters. But this group is not based 
internally on mutual equality, as three great powers, the United 
States, Japan and Germany form a triumvirate, so that the United 
States will almost without exception consult in advance with the 
other two before taking any important decision. In view of the 
endeavours of the United States to share the burden of governing 
the world system, and of the aspirations of some other countries 
to gain more influence, the new hegemony could be a concensus 
between certain leading powers ruling through the medium of 
international organizations. 
There is a real possibility, however, that the system could 
not be controlled for very long by this kind of international 
organization, and that some other form of geopolitical order 
would manifest itself. Possible scenarios will be discussed later, 
but all of them have the common feature that they entail some 
degree of disorder, the possible reasons for which were 
mentioned earlier. In a nutshell, the present growth ideology may 
not go on solving local and global problems for ever and 
providing security for citizens. It must be remembered that 
hegemonies have always been deposed sooner or later. There will 
then be two main alternatives, global steering of the world 
towards a sustainable system connected with universal 
solidarity, or implacable competition. The former is desired and 
the latter feared by scholars such as Georg Henrik von Wright, 
who perceives that we are slowly moving towards increasing 
disorder.73  
John Lewis Gaddis considers that the competition between 
democracy and totalitarianism will be replaced by a clash 
between forces representing integration and fragmentation.74 
Robert Gilpin predicts that economic nationalism, splitting world 
trade and givig rise to sectorial protectionism will probably 
replace the present capitalistic world order maintained by one 
hegemonic power.75 But there are even more pessimistic 
scenarios, such as Robert Kaplan s "global anarchy".76 In any 
case, the official developmental optimism must not be allowed to 
hinder the study of other possible outcomes. One has to 
remember that people who believe in social evolution and 
rational progress blamed Oswald Spengler for his pessimistic 
views before the First World War. 
Changes in geopolitical order have been linked with major 
economic and cultural upheavals, and all these phenomena have 
been seen as cyclic in nature, as foreseen by Arnold Toynbee, the 
most famous advocate of the notion of cultural cycles. The 
Russian Nikolai Kondratieff presented evidence for cycles in 
economies as early as 1922, including the theory that the length 
of one cycle in the industrialized countries, consisting of a growth 
period and a recession, is about 50 years. Later research has lent 
a certain credibility to this hypothesis." Peter Taylor tried to 
ascertain the link between the Kondratieff cycles and the phase 
of hegemony, which in turn is connected with the geopolitical 
world order,7 ' and proposed that the duration of one hegemony 
spans two geopolitical world orders. The periods of hegemony 
follow the Kondratieff cycles in the sense that the rise and fall of 
a hegemony corresponds to the time period occupied by two 
successive Kondratieff waves. Thus a hegemony lasts for roughly 
100 years if the duration of one world order is about 50 years. 
This hypothesis of Taylor's is presented here in the form of a 
simplified table. 
Kondradtjeff cycle Phase of hegemony Geopolitical order 
1. Growth period Rise Successor system of the 
1. Recession Victory previous hegemony 
2. Growth period Maturity New stabilized world 
2. Recession Decline order 
Fig 5. Relation between economic cycles and geopolitical world orders 
Taylor proposes that there have been two geopolitical world 
orders during the 20th century, the system that succeeded the 
British Empire and the Cold War system, both with short 
preceding transition periods. Both of these belong to the 
hegemonic era of the United States. It was during the first that 
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the might of the United States was built up, and it was at the end 
of this period that that country surpassed its competitors, while 
during the second order the hegemony reached its maturity, until 
the supremacy began to diminish and potential competitors came 
into sight. If this scheme is valid, we are at present living in a 
transition period leading to a new hegemony and a new world 
order. It would also mean the beginning of a new Kondratieff 
cycle, actually the fifth in the history of the industrial era 
according to Taylor's calender. This would also mean that at least 
some powers must be experiencing an economic upswing or will 
shortly do so. 
5.3 Theoretical new world orders 
No single scenario can be pointed out as the clear outcome of the 
present situation, but it should be remembered that towards the 
end of the Second World War there were several alternatives for 
the new geopolitical world order depending on the mutual 
importance assigned to economic, political and ideological 
aspects. Taylor lists the orders that were under serious 
consideration as the following:79 
1) One peaceful world led by a large coalition. 
2) Three separate pan areas led by Britain, the United 
States and the Soviet Union. 
3) The anti imperialistic front consisting of the United 
States and the Soviet Union to balance the British 
Empire. 
4) An anti hegemony front consisting of Britain and the 
Soviet Union to resist the economic dominance of the 
United States. 
5) A united front of the United States and Britain against 
the communist world. 
When considering these alternatives, one has to remember 
that Britain was one of the victors in the war and the break up of 
its empire could not be foreseen, any more than could the 
collapse of the democracies of Eastern Europe. 
Today there are likewise several foreseeable outcomes. 
According to the theory of Samuel Huntington, the geopolitical 
regions will coincide with the areas of the main cultures, namely 
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the Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-
Orthodox, Latin-American and eventually African civilizations. 
Conflicts will be initiated in the future when a nation is hampered 
by finding its in the "wrong" reference group, and culture will 
replace ideology as the cause of such conflicts. 
Johan Galtung outlined following alternatives as early as 
1979:'0 
1) Competition between ten major powers 
2) Three pan areas 
3) Dichotomy between North and South. 
The driving forces in Galltung's scenarios were both cultural and 
economic. Immanuel Wallerstein thinks that the United States 
could ally itself with China and Japan, thus leaving only one 
alternative for Europe, to build a new "Greater Europe" coalition 
together with Eastern Europe, North-Africa, the Middle East and 
even India.81  
Robert Taylor identifies four possible geopolitical world 
order models for the future: 
1) Concensus between the power centres of the world. 
There would be competition between them, but the 
system would be regulated by the U.N. Security 
Council and the G7 group. In other words this 
alternative would be a state of structural hegemony. 
2) Several autarchic pan-areas; 
3) Two competing coalitions separated by the Atlantic 
Ocean, one block being the "New Great Europe", i.e. 
Western Europe together with Russia, the Middle East 
and Africa, and the other America with the Pacific Rim; 
4) A new northern "Heartland" and the encircling islamic 
world. 
Taylor himself seems to consider the third possibility, a new 
bipolar world, the most likely outcome, and this scenario is 
consistent with the scheme of Wallerstein. The scenario could be 
described as the mighty sea power forcing the continental powers 
into unification, and not vice versa, as in the old geopolitical 
theories. There are also suggestions, especially in Britain, that 
Western Europe and North America should form an economic 
co-operation area to balance the rising power of Asia. This project 
clearly resembles traditional geopolitical theories. Even closer to 
Mackinder is Saul Cohen, who thinks that the contrast between 
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the maritime and continental realms still forms the upper 
structure of the modern geopolitical system, with politically 
fragmented and unstable shatterbelts lying between these realms. 
The competition between maritime powers belongs to the second 
level of the system. In this context the continental realm consists 
of Russia and China with their neighbours.82 
A study on Finland and Possible Worlds, published in 
Finland in 1995,83  deals with different scenarios for the world and 
Finland's place within it. The resulting five alternatives are 
included to greater or lesser extents in the suggestions outlined 
above. The first is consistent with the concensus of three power 
centres, the United States, the European Union and Japan, co 
operating and competing with each other. The second is 
characterized by uneven development and social and political 
upheavals caused by transnational economic forces. The role of 
the United States would be accentuated in this case. The third 
alternative follows the civilization idea of Huntington and the 
fourth scenario is a break-up of the present system leading to 
global disorder. The last scenario is an "old fashioned" state of 
competition for power and influence between five major powers, 
the United States, the European Union, Japan, China and Russia. 
All the alternative world pictures presented above are 
inherently geopolitical and refer to the reasons for spatial 
arrangements and competition between geographically defined 
political entities. The cause of the differences between individual 
researchers and scenarios lies in the uncertainty as to which 
forces that are the most influential ones in the formation of 
alliances and hegemonies. Some stress politics or economics and 
others cultural differences or geographical proximity. 
In summary, the above scenarios can be compressed into 
three main alternatives: 
1) Division of the world into three pan-areas, the degree 
of competition between which would vary according to 
the economic paradigm that is accepted. 
2) Division into two parts, one more maritime and one 
more continental. Two alternative dividing lines exist 
here, either through the Atlantic Ocean or through the 
Pacific Ocean. 
3) Break-up of the present world system into several 
competing parts and a return to the "old" geopolitics, 
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in which possessions and spheres of influence are 
important. 
The borders between the regions in these scenarios would 
not necessarily follow the present borderlines between states. The 
system could be mixed with an impact from states, civilizations 
and economic areas led by specific growth centres. The 
dichotomy between North and South cannot be compared with 
these three categories, because it is not based on competition 
between societies with equally matched capacities. It is more a 
part of the description of the contemporary structural hegemonic 
system and the disparity existing within it. 
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6 TRENDS 
IN CERTAIN VITAL REGIONS 
6.1 Qualities of a global power 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the extent to which 
certain states and alliances could fulfil the qualifications for a 
global power within the next two or three decades. Irrespective 
of the degree of relation between consensus and competition, the 
highest level in the world system will be occupied by states and 
coalitions with world-wide influence. Before examining actual 
trends in certain important parts of the world, it is useful to 
discuss the qualities required of a modern power with a global 
voice. 
A global role needs both the will and the ability to mobilize 
resources for world-wide purposes. John Agnew proposes that 
the necessary qualifications are economic and military power on 
the one hand and will and vision on the other.84 The military 
dimension of this power has diminished for the present, to be 
partly replaced by economic might. There are even opinions that 
the link between economic and military capacity that was the key 
to dominance was broken at the end of the Cold War. If this were 
true, it would also increase the difficulty of predicting which will 
be the future great powers." In fact this argument only partly 
holds true. If there is will to maintain great power status even 
during critical times and economic sanctions do not have the 
desired effect, a certain military capacity must be available. 
A maritime position is still favourable, because it allows 
global accessibility. World trade and the whole market economy 
are almost totally dependent on marine lines of communication. 
The volume of seaborne freight exceeds that of airborne freight 
by a factor of more than 200, and a ton of airfreight takes an 
average of 47 times more energy to transport than a ton of sea 
cargo.86 Modelski and Thompson present extensive statistical 
analyses to prove that all previous world powers during the last 
500 years have been maritime nations. It seems that the United 
States at present rules the oceans with its naval forces, and could 
if necessary determine the pattern of world trade and dictate 
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which goods will be transported to where and under which 
conditions.$' Marine lines of communications are also needed for 
large military operations abroad. During the Gulf War roughly 
90% of the allied forces' material was transported to the area by 
sea. 
But a potential world power must have a comparable degree 
of capacity in the following traditional categories: economics, 
political cohesion, population, world-wide military capacity, 
nuclear weapons, a physical base and an advanced level of 
technology and training. The military qualifications are the 
following: 
- 	forces with state of the art armaments 
- a world-wide surveillance and command network. The 
surveillance system must include a satellite system. 
- naval capacity to protect the marine lines of 
communication and to project force over all the 
continents. Aircraft carriers and a blue water navy with 
tenders and bases would be needed. 
- 	nuclear weapons as deterrents. It is estimated that this 
would mean some 10-20 nuclear-powered submarines 
with ballistic missiles and the same number of attack 
submarines to protect them.88 
6.2 The United States 
The United States is and will be a global power. Its gross national 
product is by far the highest in the world, and it occupies a 
leading position in many fields of science and technology. It has 
a great potential for adjustment to new products and production 
methods, and its military capacity is superior to all other defence 
forces. It has a flexible arsenal of nuclear deterrents and is capable 
of providing its "conventional" forces with modern equipment 
of a kind that no other nation cannot afford. At present only the 
United States fulfils the criteria for a global power. 
There is another side to the picture of the United States, 
however. According to OECD statistics its share of global 
industrial production was about 40% in the 1950s but is only 20% 
nowadays, in the mid-1990s. The real increase in GNP has 
declined over the decades and there are enormous internal 
problems, including dilapidated infrastructure and unevenly 
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distributed poverty. The average per capita incomes began to 
diverge regionally in the 1980s, and the principal feature of 
American income patterns since 1974 has not been growth but 
redistribution from poor and middle-class households to richer 
ones. "A resurgence of protectionism and growing hostility to 
liberal internationalism in the regions most affected by job loss 
and economic decline is one not surprising result".89 
Three explanations have been advanced for this 
development. The first, the overcommitment argument, 
maintains that the United States has excessive world-wide 
military and humanitarian obligations. In response to this 
opinion the military budget has been cut and the military 
presence abroad reduced since 1992. The second explanation is 
that capital has not accumulated sufficiently and that the federal 
deficit has grown because of excessive spending on 
infrastructure, education and social benefits. This is not a very 
good argument, however, because of all the major industrial 
countries, only Japan consumed a smaller proportion in public 
services. The third explanation is that American industry has 
been successful chiefly on account of productive investments 
abroad. From a geopolitical point of view one has to ask whether 
the U.S. government can use this industry to support its foreign 
policy. It is difficult to give a proper answer, but there is a closer 
linkage between industry and administration than in many other 
countries, and US firms gain very real benefits from remaining 
American. "For example, that the Dollar remains the medium of 
international trade, that regulatory and standard-setting bodies 
are world leaders and work closely with US industry, that the US 
courts are major means of defence of commercial and property 
rights throughout the world, that the Federal Government is a 
massive subsidizer of R & D and also a strong protector of the 
interests of US firms abroad."90 As the leading nation, the United 
States can take measures such as trade embargoes and prohibit 
the export of strategic goods more easily than others. 
Various measures have been taken to counteract the relative 
decline, and many politicians and economists in the 1990s have 
demanded a strategic trade policy that includes industrial policy 
and foreign investment. Their slogan has been "fair trade instead 
of free trade". In order to revitalize the economy, the North 
American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) was founded in 1992, partly 
as an answer to the integration processes in Europe and Asia. 
The results of these measures are disputed, but economic growth 
during the last few years has in fact been faster than in Europe 
and the deficit is declining. 
Another fact influencing the position adopted by the United 
States is the shift in its interests towards East and South-East Asia. 
This means a return to the geopolitical ideas put forward by 
Mahan in the 1890s and Spyckman in the 1940s. This new interest 
resulted in an agreement on Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) in 1994. 
As a result of all these divergent interests and ideas there are 
three main schools of American geopolitical thinking at present. 
The right wing Republicans advocate an isolationist policy, 
claining that it would be possible to solve the country's own 
problems by cutting down the flow of money abroad. It is also 
said that as the physical security of the United States itself is no 
longer directly threatened, it would be possible to return to the 
old doctrines of "Hemisphere Defence" and isolation. The second 
school supports internationalism in the sense of global U.S. 
economic, military, humanitarian and peace-keeping interests, so 
that the country must continue to act as a global superpower, and 
the third, moderate view is a compromise that acknowledges 
interests abroad, but regards it as possible to reduce the 
American presence. The Clinton administration has defined 
important regions where the United States should maintain its 
position as the leading partner in security matters, namely 
Europe, South and Central America, East Asia, the Middle East 
and South-East Asia.91 Despite its Asian Pacific interests, the 
United States stresses that it has been and always will be a 
European power. The arguments for this are the existencee of 
deep historical and political philosophical ties and the European 
origins of American culture.92 
6.3 Russia 
Geographically, Russia is once again almost isolated from the 
western industrialised world. According to the logic of phases 
in geopolitical behaviour, as described in Chapter 3, Russia finds 
itself in a situation where it has to define its new role in the world, 
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a new geopolitical code. Part of this code should be an ideology 
that is acceptable to a vast majority of the people. In fact, 
President Yeltsin has recently publicly pleaded for ideas on a new 
Russian identity. Without this the central government would lose 
its already shaky control over the country and the independence 
of the different regions would increase. In fact some observers 
already see signs of a break-up. Moscow has de facto lost control 
in large parts of the Central Caucasus, and similar developments 
can be perceived elsewhere. When Russian laws are often not put 
into effect, the regions and autonomous republics try to rule 
themselves. Separatism is very obvious in the Far East, where 
Japanese influence is present, and Chita and Buryatia are looking 
for cooperation with China and Mongolia.93 Even St. Petersburg 
is in many respects quite independent of Moscow. The role of 
provincial governors will be strengthened once they are elected 
by the people. 
As in the United States, there are three principal geopolitical 
orientations to be followed; to turn to the west, to the east, or 
inwards, which would not be a new situation for Russia. What is 
the probable outcome? As in the American case, all the 
possibilities are real and not just imaginary. Andrei Zagorski 
refers to the three main possibilities as "Atlantism, Uralianism 
and Neo-Anti-Imperialism" .94 
Atlantism means integration and cooperation with the 
western economic and political sphere. This trend of opinion can 
be compared with the aims of the Zapadniks in the mid-19th 
century. A hopeful development from the point of view of the 
western democracies is the progress made in this integration and 
acceptance of western values. "Elections conducted according to 
international norms in 1995-96 indicate that democracy is 
beginning to establish itself".95 The present leadership is working 
in this direction, albeit halfheartedly, and Russia has taken many 
practical steps towards membership of international 
organizations and other forms of cooperation with the rest of 
Europe. 
The Uralian (or Eurasian) persuasion has its roots in the 
Slavophile and Dostoyevskian notion that Russia has a 
geopolitical "mission" to mediate between Europe and Asia. 
Russia has a culture of its own, consisting of its Slavonic heritage 
and Orthodox religion, and it should not even try to be a part of 
50 
the West but develop from its own starting-points. This means 
rejection of the western Eurocentric image of history, and with it 
western concepts of liberal democracy, justice, 
parliamentarianism and individual human rights. The 
supporters of this doctrine claim that integration with western 
economies will not work in Russia, and that it would be absurd 
and dangerous to borrow an economic model that is inconsistent 
with the nation's cultural, intellectual and moral values.96 The 
discussion concerning Russian identity has served to revive the 
Eurasian movement of the 1920s,97 a trend which has gained 
expression in efforts to consolidate cohesion between the CIS 
states under Russian leadership. 
The third position, neo-anti-imperialism, has much of the old 
geopolitical thinking imbedded in it. It admits that there now 
exists only one superpower in the world. Peaceful stability has 
disappeared and the consequences can be seen in turbulence and 
separatism. The balance should be restored, but Russia alone is 
too weak for this. An alliance with China would create an 
Eurasian geopolitical force that could counterbalance the United 
States. In practice, Russia has taken measures to create good 
relations with China and India. Russia and China have enhanced 
their cooperation in many fields and are speaking of a strategic 
alliance and a multipolar world, in a spirit of resistance to 
western dominance.98 India and China are the most important 
customers for the Russian defence industry, and the three 
countries are also engaged in other forms of cooperation in 
military technology. 
A reborn panslavism or neoslavonism, as supported by 
Alexander Solschenitzy, for example, could be used to support 
both of the last two geopolitical directions. It would aim at 
unification of former slavonic Soviet republics and emphasize 
difference relative to the west, as does the Eurasian school of 
thought. Only the liberation of forces that originate from its 
centuries-old spiritual, religious and social traditions can 
preserve Russia from a total collapse. The idea of a balance of 
power is imbedded in this philosophy, as it is in neo-anti-
imperialism. Neoslavonism stresses only Slavic origins, and apart 
from Kazakhstan, it does not acknowledge the Mohammedan 
nations as part of the Russian Empire, nor does it contemplate 
any close alliance with China. 
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A survey of the distribution of support for these orientations 
within the Russian political, economic and military elites shows 
that one third would be ready to support an Atlantic orientation 
and one third an anti-imperialistic policy, but that if the Uralian 
option were to be selected, three out of four would opt for it. This 
means, of course, that some people could support more than one 
option, and that a clear majority could accept an independent 
policy as the best compromise.99 
Seen from the perspective of common geopolitical behaviour 
in the past, Russia is going through a phase in which it has to 
consolidate its power and develop its resources. Earlier in this 
phase, when competitive power was weak, states are apt to 
concentrate on internal growth and protectionism, and events 
would appear to point in this direction in the present case of 
Russia. It all depends, however, on how favourable the terms of 
cooperation offered by the western countries and their companies 
prove to be, which will in turn depend on how badly Russia's 
potential resources are needed in world-wide economic 
competition. Foreign aid, which is tied to geopolitical 
considerations, will not have any decisive influence. In fact the 
Ukraine has received more American aid in 1997 than Russia.'°° 
6.4 Asia 
Two opposite trends are to be perceived in Asia: increasing 
economic cooperation on the one hand and growing political 
competition and a military build-up on the other. Despite its 
present economic difficulties, Japan is still by far the strongest 
economic force in Asia, and has now passed through its most 
protectionist phase, which helped it to consolidate its power. Its 
balance of trade has shown a surplus for four decades, and a great 
proportion of this surplus has been with the United States, 
Europe and the other countries of Asia. Investments in Europe 
and America have declined in recent years and the proportion of 
investments in Asia has grown. Foreign investment in Japan has 
been only 10-15% of Japanese investments abroad, which has led 
to a one-sided influence. Japanese companies hold tight control 
over their subsidiaries abroad, and the strategically most 
important components and products are produced at home.'°' 
The integration of corporate Japan has helped create a true "co 
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prosperity sphere" in Asia. "Washington must now address the 
economic threat, if indeed there is one, as a pan-Asian, not 
Japanese, problem".102 Japan has been the world's largest aid 
donor, and much of its overseas development assistance has 
taken the form of loans. "Japan directs much of its money to Asia 
so as to carve out a sphere of influence".103  Thus its Overseas 
Economic Co operation Fund had 78% of its loans outstanding in 
Asia at the end of 1994, the biggest recipients being Indonesia, 
China, the Philippines, India and Thailand. 
Japanese capital has been an important factor in the 
development of the South-East Asian countries in particular, 
through an association (ASEAN) founded as early as 1967. Japan 
has shown increasing economic and political interest in South-
East Asia and Indochina during the last few years,104 and the 
ASEAN countries have now decided to implement an Asian Free 
Trade Area (AFTA) as from 2008. Following the entry of Vietnam 
in 1995, ASEAN has 425 million inhabitants, and more members 
are expected within some years.105 
China is going through a period of rapid economic growth, 
the average annual figure having been 9% over the period 1978-
1994. The biggest investors have been Chinese living in Hong 
Kong, Taiwan and the United States. China is connected to the 
international business community through an ethnic Chinese 
network of businessmen, who are particularly active in South-
East Asia. The investments have mainly been used in export 
industries. The Japanese share in these investments is growing in 
branches aimed at Chinese markets. The optimistic view is that 
by allowing China to join the WTO, for example, without 
insisting on adherence to its principles, the country could slowly 
be converted into a "normal" member of the trading community. 
But China is behaving like all the other great powers before it, 
developing sufficient economic potential first in order to become 
a global actor. It is in China's interest to prolong its current 
policies, as long-term expansion of its industrial base necessitates 
the use of protectionist measures.106 
The industrialized countries are in turn investing in China 
and helping it in its development aspirations in the hope of future 
returns from its huge potential market. All of this has resulted in 
a U.S. trade deficit with China which amounted to 34 billion USD 
in 1995. This situation cannot be tolerated for long, but most of 
53 
the America's business community still favours deeper 
engagement of China in the international community, believing 
that China is a good place to make money.107 The situation 
resembles that prevailing one hundred years ago, when the 
attraction of Chinese markets resulted in fierce competition 
between Japan, Russia, England, Germany and the United States. 
There are predictions that China will be a political, military 
and economic superpower somewhere round the year 2020 and 
will overtake the United States as the world's largest economy. 
These predictions probably overestimate China's development. 
One has to remember that the country's GNP is only 15% of that 
of Japan,108 and that Taiwan imports more from the United States 
than the rest of China put together. In any case, a high pace of 
growth that is based on future expectations normally slows down 
when a certain level has been achieved. If previous historical 
experience is anything to go by, the Chinese growth rate is too 
high to be sustained.109 Economically, China is dependent on 
foreign technology, capital and export markets, and its behaviour 
is attenuated by the fact that provocative policies could suspend 
participation of the advanced industrial countries in its economy 
and risk ending its economic success story.110 China also has 
enormous problems ahead. It posssesses 22% of the world's 
population but only 7% of its arable land. Farmland is being 
swallowed up by cities and roads, to the extent that almost 1% of 
is being lost each year.11' At the same time its regions are 
developing in an utterly uneven manner. The central government 
has lost some of its authority, it lacks financial resources and the 
rule of law is defective. Internal migration is assuming enormous 
proportions, so that a total of over 400 million people are likely to 
be affected, and unemployment could rise to over 280 million.l'z 
India has also gained in importance as a target for 
investment since it adopted more liberal policies. India's political 
system makes the country a more predictable partner than China, 
but the United Nations Population Fund points out that the 
country's rapidly growing population will almost reach that of 
China by the year 2025, 1400 million vs. 1500 million. 
In summary, there are two economic trends affecting Asia at 
present, globalization and regionalization, both of which are 
vulnerable to disturbances, the former more so than the latter. 
Culture favours regional cooperation, and the Japanese structure 
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of business regulation is spreading to other Asian countries. 
Cultural exchanges and the studying of other Asian languages 
are becoming more and more popular. 
On the political and military front the situation is one of 
regional and subregional competition for leadership. Japan and 
China are suspicious about each others' aims, and the Japan 
Defence Agency has for the first time indicated that it regards 
China as one of the potential regional threats to Japan.113 The 
countries have territorial disputes over the Senkaku, or Diaoju 
Islands. Thus Japan is discussing economic cooperation with the 
regions of China rather than with the central government. 
China's army is the world's largest, and it is modernizing its 
armaments, mainly with Russian material, but Japan can spend 
more money on more modern equipment. Japan's defence zone 
has now been extended to 1000 nautical miles, and if the 
Americans were to reduce their forces in the area any further, 
Japan might be forced to increase its defence area and reinforce 
its self-defence forces to counterbalance China and secure its 
marine lines of communication in South East Asia.14 
The ASEAN countries are spending much more on defence 
than earlier, and regional disputes are continuing with China 
over the Paracel and Spratly Islands and over gas and oil 
resources. The southern coast plays a central role in China's 
development programs, and according to some statements the 
South China Sea and Spartly Island will be the key to coming 
challenges in the next century. The area features prominently in 
China's national geopolitical code, and regardless of political 
orientation, the leaders and people of China alike consider that 
the other states in the region have taken advantage of China's 
internal conflicts and occupied islands and claimed sea areas that 
belong to her."-' 
In South Asia there is a power struggle taking place between 
China, India and Pakistan, accompanied by a number of 
territorial disputes. All three countries probably possess nuclear 
weapons, and each of them has developed missiles which could 
carry nuclear warheads. China even has several intercontinental 
ballistic missiles. CIA has issued a warning that the India 
Pakistan border is the most probable site for a future nuclear war. 
The cold war in South Asia is fuelled by a recent history of fierce 
conventional battles.116 India's military capacity is growing 
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rapidly, and it is suspected that the country has ambitions to 
exercise influence over an area extending "from Aden to 
Singapore" 117 
China is still some decades away from becoming a major 
global power. Its only assets at present are its population and its 
rapid economic growth on the strength of foreign money, and 
the same can be said of India. Japan is an economic giant, 
growing in political self esteem and influence, but its military 
capability is modest. Even if Japan were to decide to acquire a 
global military capability, the accomplishment of this would take 
a further fifteen to twenty years."' 
6.5 Western Europe 
Geopolitically the most important features in this area will be the 
coherence and geographical extent of the European Union and 
its relations with the outer world, especially Russia and the 
United States. The central question regarding coherence is 
whether the union will be developed into a federation and a great 
power with a geopolitical code of its own surpassing those of the 
member states. Officially this is denied on the grounds of the 
independence and cultural diversity of the member states, but 
seen against the background of history, there are signs that point 
towards the patterns of geopolitical behaviour adopted by all 
previous great powers, and towards a similar approach to 
gradual unification to that prevailing between the German states 
in the 19th century. 
The Union's aim is definitely to increase the competitiveness 
of its industry within a single European market, which in fact 
means a system with many protectionist and mercantilist 
features. Competitiveness is considered especially important in 
strategic fields such as aviation and defence. "Cooperation in 
defence purchases, with the aim of making the defence industries 
of NATO's European member states more competitive, is being 
developed within the WEU".119  The ongoing consolidation of the 
defence industry throughout Europe is a matter of critical 
urgency in order to be able to face increasing competition from 
the American industry. Likewise, self-sufficiency in many civilian 
fields such as forestry is considered to be of importance. EU's 
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internal unity is being enhanced through an active campaign 
launched by the EU Commission for a European (= West 
European) identity. Common cultural features are being stressed 
and differences between the nations are being softened by active 
measures such as the increasing of movement across the internal 
borders. Common symbols are being created, and the 
forthcoming common currency will be needed more to 
consolidate unity and make separation more difficult than for 
economic reasons. Communications networks are being planned, 
and their construction is supported financially from the centre. 
The steps seem to be leading from a customs union in the 
direction of a federation, but it is not clear whether the 
development will halt at some level in between. 
A bent for geographical accretion has been one of the main 
characteristics of geopolitical entities. In this respect the EU is 
behaving geopolitically, for its visions include a future Greater 
Europe. It is envisaged that the enlargement will take place by 
pulling in adjacent countries, which was the typical way of 
thinking in the USA in the period of its most rapid expansion. 
The European Union is not credible as a great power at present, 
as it still lacks political cohesion, but there are strong forces and 
organizational dynamics that are pushing it towards a common 
foreign and security policy. It is eager to be present in 
negotiations and settlements that well could be taken care of by 
the United Nations or the OSCE alone. On the other hand, some 
member states harbour strong opinions against a federalist 
future. 
There have traditionally been two trends in security policy 
in Western Europe: Atlantic and pan-European. Official 
statements try to achieve a balance between these two views, and 
the West European Union (WEU) is described as "the European 
pillar of NATO". NATO has decided to develop Combined Joint 
Task Forces that could operate under either NATO or WEU, and 
the organizations responsible for European and American troops 
are to be "separable but not separate".120 NATO standards and 
the use of existing command systems and other infrastructure 
offer in effect the only sensible grounds for defence in Western 
Europe, as an independent WEU would mean unnecessary and 
expensive duplication of systems. All activities within the NATO 
area could already be handled by European troops alone, but 
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there have been plans to develop Europe's own satellite 
surveillance system, and a Union-level deterrent force consisting 
of the nuclear armament of France and England has been 
discussed. Behind these aspirations for "independence" lie 
mainly questions of prestige and geopolitical considerations. 
A separate Western European defence would make sense in 
the following cases: 
- 	if the United States were to withdraw from Europe, 
- 	if the area of operations were stretched to places where 
the United States was not willing to participate, e.g. 
Eastern Europe or North Africa, 
- 	if the European countries did not want to be involved 
in conflicts involving Turkey, 
- 	if the European Union wanted to achieve global great 
power status, and/or 
- if NATO really was transformed from a defence alliance 
into a continental peace-keeping organization, and 
Europe still needed a defence alliance. 
The European Union could in principle create the capacity for a 
global geopolitical role. It already has enough economic capacity 
and human resources; its total number of uniformed soldiers 
exceeds that of the United States. On the other hand, the 
following would still be needed: the political will, command and 
military satellite systems of its own, an adequate naval force to 
make the projection of power possible in all parts of the world, 
and a "sufficient" nuclear deterrent. 
If the decision were to be made to create this capacity, it would 
take approximately ten years to achieve it. 
A further question concerns the expansion and "final" 
geographical limits of the European Union. Like all previous 
great powers, it wants to be as large and powerful as possible in 
the light of the benefits, costs and competition. The history of the 
idea of European unity provides us with hints as to which 
countries could be expected to be members and which would 
most likely be left out. Almost all such plans made during the 
past 700 years have excluded Russia and Turkey. It has always 
been the opinion that the basis of unification must be a similarity 
in values and appreciations that are grounded in religion. The 
concrete goals have been inner peace, welfare and defence 
against external threats. Turkey has been excluded because it 
represents a difference in religion and mentality. Iver Neuman 
and Jennifer Welsh conclude that the whole idea of Europe has 
been defined with help of "the Other", in terms what Europe is 
not. "The Other" has played a decisive role in the formation of 
European identity, and the ruling "Other" in history has been 
Turkey and the Ottoman Empire.121  The same basic ideas form an 
obstacle to acceptance of the present Turkish application for EU 
membership. 
In the Russian case, too, the old arguments still stand. Russia 
was excluded from the historical plans because of differences in 
culture, ethnic incoherence, economic problems and above all its 
size, which means that it does not fit in with European 
dimensions. Like Turkey, Russia has often posed a threat to 
Western Europe. It may be that the European Community could 
never have been formed without the threat from the Soviet 
Union. As the German Minister of Defence, Volker Ruhe, put it: 
"The enormous potential and geostrategic location of Russia 
exceed the European dimensions to an explosive extent. They 
exclude membership of EU and our alliances. ..".172 
Culture seems likely to be the most influential aspect in 
determining where the "final" borders of the European Union 
will be drawn, even if economic indices and political aspects such 
as peace and democracy are used as formal criteria for 
membership. Culture directs the decisions of politicians, and 
even influences economic connections and political systems. 
Economic needs could be satisfied by a customs union, e.g. with 
Turkey, or by other forms of economic cooperation, as in the case 
of Russia. But alongside culture there are also direct geopolitical 
goals, e.g. the German desire not to be situated on the eastern 
border of the Union, an idea which is in itself concrete evidence 
that borders still matter. 
Whatever the economic criteria, if the Union has to expand, 
the most coherent result could be created by limiting membership 
to countries where attitudes and traditions are based on western 
religion; i.e. the Baltic States, Poland, Hungary, the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia and Croatia. The Germans 
traditionally include the two last-mentioned states within Central 
Europe for cultural and geographical reasons,'23  a fact whose 
significance became obvious during the process of achieving 
recognition for Slovenia, which was initiated by Germany alone. 
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The coherence even of a union of this kind would be exposed 
to external economic challenges and inner dissentions. The order 
of precedence of Atlantic and European orientations in Britain is 
different from that in France, Britain, Germany and the Nordic 
Countries support an Atlantic Free Trade Area, whilst France and 
the other Mediterranean countries are against it. Impressions of 
the external threat and other security aspects are totally different 
in the Mediterranean area from what they are near the Russian 
border. There are cultural differences between the Protestant 
north and the Catholic south that can be discerned in business 
styles, political systems, the upbringing of children and every 
aspect of social life. Thus all the main factors, political, economic 
and cultural, that normally influence geopolitical settings speak 
for a certain division into North and South within the European 
Union, and possibly other divisions as well. The prominence of 
this fact depends on how strong the external challenges to the 
Union as a whole are by comparison with the centrifugal forces. 
The future of the Union and the geopolitical status of Northern 
Europe will thus be determined by the nature and structure of 
the forthcoming world geopolitical system. 
7 NORTHERN EUROPE: 
PAST AND PRESENT 
7.1 The geopolitical situation in the past 
There have been two geopolitical stress factors in Northern 
Europe in the course of history: regional competition for 
supremacy, and disagreement between the local ruling power 
and external maritime powers over the status of the area. The 
latter tension emerged during the periods of Dutch and British 
dominance in internal European matters, but developed later to 
form a part of the global Heartland-Rimland-Midland Ocean 
problem. Traditionally, the ruling regional power, the Hanseatic 
League, Denmark, Sweden, Germany or the Soviet Union, has 
tried to restrict the use of the area and access by outsiders, to 
make the Baltic Sea a Mare clausum, while the main maritime 
power has opposed this by claiming for it the status of a Mare 
liberum. 
In the 18th century Sweden lost its position in favour of 
Russia, and Poland forfeited its access to the sea and was divided. 
Poland's ally, the ancient great power Lithuania, was annexed to 
Russia, and Prussia took over the role of Poland as a major Baltic 
nation. Since then the characteristic feature in Northern Europe 
has been a power struggle between Russia and Germany. The 
emerging global geopolitical system can be traced back to the 
18th century, when England intervened in the Baltic situation in 
1719-1720, during the Great Northern War, balancing the 
situation and preventing Russia from making the Baltic into a 
Russian inland sea.124 
Denmark, as a neutral buffer state between the maritime and 
continental powers, had to go to war against Britain at the 
beginning of the 19th century and against Prussia in the 1860s. 
Thus Sweden, Denmark and Norway formed an inner circle of 
three small countries surrounded in turn by an outer circle of 
three great powers. Kjellen explained in 1915 that Sweden had 
two possibilities, either neutrality based on a strong defence, or 
alliance with Germany to resist Russian expansion."' 
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Poland, Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania became 
independent after the First World War and aimed at neutrality. 
Both Germany and the Soviet Union were then reduced to a state 
of weakness. Britain dominated the Baltic Sea and secured the 
independence of the Baltic States by sending a naval force to the 
area. The buffer zone across Europe recommended by Mackinder 
was created, including the Danzig corridor, and under the 
dominance of this geopolitical image the Nordic and Baltic 
countries had no other options in practice than to strive for 
neutrality, together or separately. The zone functioned well until 
Germany became the major threat to the western countries 
instead of Russia. The Soviet Union, Britain and France began in 
spring 1939 to negotiate over how to contain Germany, and the 
Soviet Union claimed the right to initiate defensive actions in the 
buffer zone extending from Finland to Rumania against a direct 
or indirect attack, even without the consent of the countries in 
question. The western powers tried to limit the Soviet claims, 
especially where Finland was concerned, but Russia insisted on 
including Finland in the same group as the Baltic States. In 
August 1939 the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact finally negated the 
whole idea of a buffer zone. 
The geopolitical picture after the Second World War, as 
presented by Brzezinski (Fig. 2), included the former buffer zone 
extending into the Heartland. The Baltic States, Poland, East 
Germany and the main part of the Baltic Sea belonged to the 
Heartland and the Soviet defence zone. Norway and Denmark 
abandoned their neutrality, after the failure of negotiations for a 
Scandinavian defence alliance and were accepted into NATO. 
Sweden was situated on the border in the prevailing geopolitical 
scheme and managed to keep its non-alliance policy, even if 
inclined towards the west. Finland was considered to be a rand 
state of the Soviet Union and to be likely to be occupied in the 
initial phase of an eventual war,126  even though the government 
of the United States directed its export policy towards 
maintaining and, if possible, increasing Finland's independence 
and democratic social order.127 In these circumstances Finland 
had no option but to try to preserve its neutrality as far as 
possible, even though President Paasikivi admitted that the 
Soviet Union had "legitime interests" on its north western border. 
Denmark and Norway were given an important role in the 
western policy of containment, as bases for air force and naval 
units. As Mackinder had foreseen, the Soviet Union aspired to a 
global role comparable to that of the United States, by enhancing 
its maritime resources, including its navy, fisheries, merchant 
navy and shipbuilding capacity, and the Baltic Sea area played 
an essential part in this policy. When submarine-launched 
ballistic missiles became an irreplaceable part of the nuclear 
deterrent force, the Kola Peninsula became a base and fortress of 
global importance. 
The geopolitical approach serves well for describing and 
explaining the political situation in Northern Europe up to the 
time of the collapse of the Soviet empire. The Anglo-Saxon sea 
power - heartland image can be invoked, and the history of 
Northern Europe can be interpreted as a result of an attempt by 
the maritime power to prevent a competing power from arising 
on the continent of Europe (18th and 19th centuries) or in Eurasia 
(19th century). Whether the theories describe the real situation or 
whether they merely caused a form of behaviour which led to 
the observed consequences is another thing. Most probably the 
truth is a mixture of both aspects. In any case, geopolitical 
expansion and dominance of the "old type" can be observed 
alongside highly homogenized geopolitical codes. 
7.2 The present hegemony and Northern Europe 
The geopolitical "one superpower" image leads to an 
interpretation in which Western Europe is an essential part of a 
global economic system created and led by the United States. But 
the European subcontinent is not economically and politically 
united, and Russia is only weakly integrated into the system. 
There exist remnants of the old bipolar geopolitical world, 
especially in the north, and there is still a border between east 
and west running through Europe, only it is no longer an 
ideological border but a cultural, economic and political one, and 
it is not an iron curtain preventing all unofficial connections. 
There is a grey zone between Russia and the European 
Union (or NATO), the status of which is partly an open question. 
This is not merely a question of political prestige but of a shift in 
the strategic centre of gravity in the Baltic region the Baltic 
Approaches to Baltic Sea proper and the Gulf of Finland. Instead 
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of control and defence of the Straits of Denmark, the military 
problem is now Russia's surveillance and defence area. Although 
the means used at present are "soft", the question is 
fundamentally a geopolitical one: how far the respective spheres 
of interest will extend. From the western point of view it may not 
be a question of spreading influence and dominance in the old 
sense, but more one of exercising some pull on adjacent countries 
which are afraid of the potential costs of exclusion. In spite of 
this, however, there is a political will to extend the western type 
of political and economic system eastwards in the name of 
democracy and stability. Even in earlier times, especially in the 
case of the United States, geopolitical expansion had been 
motivated by the attractions of a better system and the spread of 
democracy. Somewhere the "final" borders would be reached in 
any case. As argued earlier, the EU and NATO of the future 
might well finally extend to the old cultural border. 
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From the Russian point of view accretion on one side means 
curtailment on the other. Russia wants to be regarded as an 
influential power and to keep up its global nuclear force. It is 
more than 30 times larger in area than the largest Western 
European country, France, and the U.S. Defence Department 
counts it by virtue of its size, geostrategic significance and 
military power as pre-eminent among the states that arose out of 
the communist tyranny.128 The former "liberal" Russian foreign 
minister, Andrei Kozyrev, declared that Russia had a right even 
to military intervention in all the countries having Russian 
minorities in order to protect them. 
With the radical change in the balance of power, the former 
rand states and ex-Soviet republics have been trying to create a 
new geopolitical code for themselves. Austria, Sweden and 
Finland became EU members in 1995, but the question of NATO 
membership is still under debate. Finland has officially stated 
that the geopolitical change enabled the country to make its own 
choice, which was to join the West, a clear geopolitical decision, 
and President Ahtisaari has claimed that EU membership 
strengthens Finland's security. Most of the other nations located 
between the EU and Russia are striving hard to rid themselves of 
their grey, or buffer zone status, for fear that agreements will be 
concluded over their heads. 
NATO was created in 1949 to resist Soviet expansion and to 
ensure an American presence and American interests in Europe 
by displacing the Western European Union, established one year 
earlier. Of the European countries, it was the United Kingdom, 
that began secret negotiations with the United States and Canada 
to these ends in 1948. In the one superpower world, NATO stands 
out as the dominant security system in Europe. Its continued 
existence was under serious discussion after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, but it has now modified its mission and taken on 
tasks of a new kind, partly through the United Nations. As a 
regional military alliance, however, it will have clear borders, 
whereever they may lie, and the threat is assumed to come from 
the outside, apart from perhaps some minor internal rebellions 
against democracy. There will be two categories of border in 
Europe, one protected by NATO and the other not, the latter 
being the only ones that some countries are concerned about.'29 
Now NATO has announced plans to expand eastwards, into the 
present grey zone. The first new members will be Poland, the 
Czech Republic and Hungary, which are also strong candidates 
for the EU. This plan would bring NATO to the border of the 
Ukraine, but still leave the Baltic States outside. The German 
desire to relinquish its borderland position would be fulfilled, 
while the Ukraine would then be a buffer country. In fact the term 
neutrality is being mentioned increasingly often in the Ukraine 
at the present time. 
As a reaction to this, Russia is trying to strengthen its 
influence in the CIS countries, to the extent that Byelarus is 
already more or less a Russian satellite. Western optimism that 
the Yeltsin administration will continue to rule and that it can be 
persuaded to accept all future NATO plans, lies on insecure 
grounds. Russia is trying to exclude the former Soviet republics 
from any NATO enlargement, and the Communist Party has 
declared that the harbours in the Baltic States should be owned 
jointly with Russia.130 This is understandable in view of the fact 
that Russia has lost the majority of its harbour capacity in Europe. 
The Baltic harbours are more important for Russia's foreign trade 
than are on the Pacific coast, in the Far East or on the Black Sea. 
More than 50 Mio tonnes of Russian transito goods were 
transported via the Baltic States in 1995, while the volumes 
handled by Finnish ports or those of the St. Petersburg area were 
each roughly one tenth of this.131  
A mutual understanding between NATO and Russia about 
which countries could join NATO would in fact resemble a 
division of Europe into spheres of influence. The Partnership for 
Peace concept aims to soften this effect and to bring NATO 
together with all the countries concerned in a structure that 
would engage in joint military planning. It is doubtful whether 
this concept can wipe away the geopolitical realities. As Henry 
Kissinger puts it, "operationally, the Partnership for Peace 
implies an arrangement aimed at China and Japan or an empty 
shell". A military alliance always exists against some potential 
military threat, through deterrence or direct action. The area of 
responsibility of AFNORTHWEST when it comes to naval 
operations in Northern Europe was extended early in the 1990s 
to cover the whole Baltic Sea, including the Gulf of Finland and 
the Gulf of Bothnia, although operations must be coordinated 
with BALTAP, which is in turn subordinated to AFCENT, in 
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which German influence is prominent. Since such an 
organization is not needed to perform sea rescue or other 
humanitarian operations in Northern Europe, NATO is implicitly 
attempting to avert the consequences of an eventual upheaval in 
Russia or prevent Russian aspirations towards its old positions 
in the Baltic States, for instance. 
The new command structure planned for NATO will consist 
of two Strategic Commands, SC Atlantic and SC Europe, 32 and 
differing security interests in Europe will be taken into account 
by dividing Europe into two main areas of responsibility along a 
line that roughly follows the cultural division between north and 
south. This means that SC Europe will be divided into two 
Regional Commands, of which the northern one will be situated 
in Holland. The new organization would mean the 
disappearance of AFNORTHWEST and provide more space and 
flexibility for subregional arrangements. 
As NATO and Russia are now separated in Central Europe, 
the relative weight on the flanks has increased, and there has 
been no decrease in troops near the Finnish border so far. Russian 
strategic nuclear weapons are concentrated in submarines based 
in the Kola area, and as a consequence of the START agreement 
55% of all Russian nuclear warheads will be in submarines by the 
year 2002. The Kola Peninsula will continue to be a base for a 
considerable body of troops in the future. The only direct border 
that NATO and EU have with Russia is in the north, and the Gulf 
of Finland still leads directly to the heart of Russia. NATO has 
increased its activities in the Baltic Sea during the last three years, 
and Russia is more determined than in the early 1990's to 
maintain its access to the sea and keep up its bases in the 
Kaliningrad area. 
The situation resembles that of the period after the First 
World War: Russia is weak and Germany has increased its power 
but is still being cautious, while an external maritime power with 
its allies dominates the security situation. A common "European 
house" with no sharp borders is still just a wish and not a fact. 
The policies and possibilities of the European Union are still 
guided and limited by old geopolitical features such as the 
American influence, the existence of NATO and the Russian self-
image of great power with a global nuclear force. The simplified 
picture painted by the old geopolitical theories of a bipolar world 
brought about by physical geography cannot explain the whole 
situation, however, as the general atmosphere and the behaviour 
of the countries involved have changed. On the other hand, we 
are still far away from the "critical geopolitics" in which 
geography has no objective influence, and from the geopolitical 
order of structural hegemony based on economics alone as 
proposed by Agnew and Corbridge. 
All the main factors promoting a geopolitical grouping, 
political, economic and cultural, are clearly visible in Northern 
Europe, thus giving an insight into the positions taken up by the 
different countries, and the situation is quite different from that 
in the Southern Europe on all geopolitical criteria. This fact 
should not only influence the NATO command structure, but 
also mean that control over the situation should be in the interest 
of all the countries in the Baltic area. One of the main concerns is 
the current grey zone status of the Baltic States. The extension of 
NATO cannot solve the overall security problem as long as 
Russia resists, and if Russia were a full member, then there would 
be no subregional defence task left for NATO in the Baltic area. 
These circumstances have led to discussions and proposals 
regarding about mutual Nordic political and military 
cooperation and even joint actions with the Baltic States. An idea 
of a military alliance or common security zone for the Nordic and 
Baltic countries has been denounced, but cooperation could be 
enhanced in many military fields. Some measures are already 
being taken to coordinate frontier guard action in the Baltic area, 
and regional cooperation and political discussions between the 
countries concerned are certainly a useful means of softening the 
dichotomy in Northern Europe. 
8 NORTHERN EUROPE IN SOME 
POTENTIAL SCENARIOS 
8.1 Competition between three economic blocs 
There are three geographical concentrations between which 
world trade and investments mainly move: Western Europe, 
North America and Japan with South-East Asia. These areas 
belong to the core of the world system by numerous criteria.1 
The motivation cited for regional economic cooperation and a 
free trade area has in each case EU, NAFTA, ASEAN been 
competition with other areas. The idea is the same as that of 
Haushofer: self sufficiency. "The (trade-) blocks are big enough 
markets themselves to stand against global pressure on specific 
policy issues if they so choose".1M The most probable outcome of 
the present situation is therefore that the future geopolitical 
world system will be characterized by competition between these 
pan-areas. The issues over which this competition takes place 
may be leadership, investments, raw materials, energy, market 
areas, patents etc. 
The "official" interpretation of the situation within GATT 
and its successor WTO has been that the formation of a number 
of free trade areas does not create obstacles to trade in general; 
on the contrary the world trade should benefit from 
organizations like EU and NAFTA. Many research institutes and 
experts on economics have nevertheless drawn the logical 
conclusion that regional alliances are incompatible with 
multilateral politics. Almost all the principal branches of 
industry, e.g. electronics and communications, aviation etc., are 
preparing themselves for intensified competition between 
geographical areas. 
This cannot happen without political consequences. The 
formation of economic and political unions will lead towards 
increasing polarization and could mean the end of the whole 
present trading system.135 Open competition between the blocs 
would break up the present security structures and increase the 
role of political and military forces once again. In such a case, 
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developments in the three areas would probably follow the old 
patterns of geopolitical behaviour as described in Chapter 3, that 
is to say from internal unification and growth to the enlargement 
of spheres of influence as far as resources allow. Each bloc would 
develop an identity of its own by emphasizing the common 
history, culture and interests of its members. Each of them would 
also adopt its own concepts of the world system and have its own 
geographical mental maps. One part of this identity would 
concern security policy. 
The option of the United States would be to expand NAFTA 
to include the whole of the American continent. This would fit 
well with the old American ideology, and the old notion of 
"Western Hemisphere" would still work as an effective 
geopolitical image. In fact a Western Hemisphere Economic Free 
Trade Area has already been proposed by President Clinton, and 
negotiations will be initiated in 1997. Only the growth of South-
American ambitions could place limits on the scheme, as the 
MERCOSUR organization uniting Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay 
and Uruguay has plans to develop into an independent South 
American Free Trade area, SAFTA. Despite protectionist blocs, 
NAFTA could still present itself as a defender of political and 
economic freedoms. Defence of the freedom of the seas and the 
definition of areas of vital interest would be as important as ever. 
The available alternative for Japan would be to intensify its 
economic, political and even military cooperation with the South-
East Asian countries and to arrange collaborative relations with 
China, Korea and eventually also India. Some support already 
exists in the countries of this region for the proposed East Asian 
Economic Caucus (EAEC) as an alternative for APEC. If the 
United States were to withdraw its forces from the area, Japan 
would be compelled to secure traffic through the world's most 
important sea route, in South China Sea and the Strait of Malacca. 
For the European Union, internal strength would become an 
highly prized target, and the organization would work more 
intensively for a federalist union than in times of relatively 
limited concurrence. A more centralized organization would give 
less freedom for regional arrangements than the present system. 
The natural direction for enlargement of the European Union 
would be Central and Eastern Europe. The acquisition of an 
additional population of 100 million would provide more 
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resources for competing against America or the Far East. The 
cultural border in Europe, which in fact goes through the 
Ukraine, would most probably limit formal extension, but in a 
world of harsh competition the EU would have no other 
alternative than to try to form some kind of alliance with the 
Orthodox-Slavonic world in which Russia would build its own 
semi-isolated empire. 
The prevailing competitive situation and the predicted new 
borders have already led to the decision by the EU to initiate free 
trade negotiations with Russia and the Ukraine. Other possible 
directions for extending the EU sphere of influence are North 
Africa and the Middle East. The extension of free trade 
arrangements to the whole Mediterranean area is in fact included 
in the long-term scenarios of the EU. This "Pan-Europe" area 
would then have one billion inhabitants, a noteworthy figure 
even by Asian standards. There are Spanish and French cultural 
influences in the North Africa that could be appealed to the 
purposes of enlargement, and as the more western-oriented 
Arabs like to point out, their ancestors moved to their present 
locations from Europe. 
The spheres of interest of the three blocs would intersect in 
the Middle East and South Asia. The oil resources of the Gulf 
area, which constitute 60% of the known resources in the world 
at present, would be important for all of them. Europe would 
have an advantage geographically, and stability in the Middle 
East is indeed mentioned as one of the most important goals in 
U.S. strategy. In addition to Japan, there are now other countries 
in East Asia, including China, that are becoming increasingly 
dependent on imported oil.136 
The raw materials and huge market areas available in India 
are of interest to Europe, which is the most important trading 
partner for India at present among the three blocs. The EU is 
already present in the Indian Ocean, as France has been able to 
retain its possessions there, and the Law of the Sea Conference in 
1982 resulted in a French economic zone of 2.8 million sq. km. 
France has a permanent army and navy in the area, and can react 
if necessary by sending aircraft carriers and nuclear 
submarines.137 
India's significance for Japanese trade is growing, and it has 
also been suggested that India should intensify its ties with Japan 
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and the ASEAN countries to balance its western connections. The 
route through the Strait of Malacca continues across the Indian 
Ocean, so that India and Japan have a common strategic interest 
in securing this line of communication. The United States, on the 
other hand, has striven to extend its military connections with 
India because it is foreseen that that country might have a 
strategic role to play in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf. Even 
Russia is still offering India cooperation in the armaments 
industry and is an important supplier of weapons. 
The distribution of power in this scenario is more even than 
in the one superpower world. The presence of geopolitics is more 
obvious, economic concurrence harder and the control of space 
and extent of influence more important. Ties between North 
America and Europe would weaken, and NATO could develop 
from a military alliance into a peace-keeping organization under 
the United Nations and the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe. The Western European Union would 
become an EU organization, separate from NATO, and the EU 
would strive for global political, military and economic influence. 
This would mean in turn that the tasks of the strengthened WEU 
would also become global ones. 
Without American protection, the EU would be compelled 
to cooperate even more closely with Russia than at present, for 
political and security reasons as well. Russia does not have such 
severe reservations about the enlargement of the European Union 
as it does about the extension of NATO, and the outcome, a 
united Western Europe collaborating with Russia, would in fact 
be consistent with the old pan-area theories. If this approach were 
to succeed, the danger of a confrontation in Northern Europe 
would diminish and the EU could concentrate on securing its 
interests elsewhere in the world. One precondition for a peaceful, 
cooperative approach is that the Russian economy should 
manifestly benefit from the situation. Such a cooperative 
arrangement could be attractive to Russia from the security point 
of view, too, as a peaceful western border would release 
resources for the southern and eastern front, where pressure is 
being experienced. 
There is a danger in this scenario, however. Without an 
American presence, Russia could try to benefit from the situation 
politically, and its aspirations could conflict with those of the EU 
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when it, too, is trying to increase its influence. The demands 
made on the Baltic States could be stepped up under the pretext 
of supporting the Russian minorities, and the Kaliningrad area 
could be used to exert political pressure on its neighbours, 
Lithuania and Poland, which might by then be actual or potential 
EU members. Also, the mere idea of Europe as a domain of the 
European Union could lead to actions beyond the present EU 
borders that are in conflict with Russian interests. This would 
also concern the Baltic Sea if it were treated as the Union's own 
inland sea. In a tripolar world Sweden and Finland would find it 
difficult to stay outside the Union's common defence system and 
Norway would be forced to choose whether to belong to the 
"Western Hemisphere" or to "Europe". 
The NATO organizations in Northern Europe would be 
replaced with some kind of regional organization of the WEU, in 
which Germany would have the largest share and Sweden and 
Finland would be included. The strength of WEU forces needed 
in Northern Europe would depend on relations with Russia and 
on the status of the three Baltic States, which in this scenario 
could be membership of the EU and WEU. Economic cooperation 
could create a favourable security policy atmosphere, but the 
situation could equally well be more unpredictable and more 
exposed to political changes in Russia than in the NATO era. The 
focal points of the EU defence and the areas most exposed to 
danger would be the northern and eastern parts of the Baltic Sea. 
The Baltic approaches would not have the same value and 
meaning from a European point of view as for the United States 
and the present NATO, and even the Kola submarine bases 
would not prove a very relevant problem for the EU. 
8.2 Other scenarios 
One of the scenarios presented earlier was the division of the 
world into two competing blocs. The trend towards APEC could 
finally lead the world into a situation where the North Atlantic is 
no longer a uniting "Midland Ocean" but a dividing space 
between two huge coalitions: Europe with its allies and the 
American-Asian coalition. Even if it is not a question of a zero 
sum game, Europe would be left out of APEC internal 
cooperation, which would involve the fastest growing economies 
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in the world. Russia's interests in Europe and Asia would be so 
diversified that the country could try to balance between the two 
blocks or might even dissolve into two or more parts. The 
competitive situation would be much harder for the European 
Union than in the previous case, especially in the Middle East, in 
the face of the resources of the APEC coalition. 
Extension of the EU's sphere of influence eastwards and 
southwards would be even more important than in a world of 
three blocs, and the focal point of EU security policy would be 
located in the southern and eastern parts of the Mediterranean 
area. The situation in Northern Europe is difficult to predict, but 
in an atmosphere of cooperation with Russia, common interests 
could make the region quite peaceful and security problems 
could be less noticeable than in the previous scenarios. The EU 
would work hard to include Russia, or at least its western parts, 
in its economic and political cooperation in order to secure access 
to its natural resources. If this were successful, then the regional 
organization of the WEU in Northern Europe could be relatively 
loose and the Baltic Sea could mainly be used as a training area 
for the WEU forces. In these circumstances the countries of 
Northern European might also be compelled to participate in 
operations on the southern front of the EU or even elsewhere in 
the world. The present tendency, to be more prepared for 
operations outside the borders of one's own country, would be 
strengthened further. The planning principle adopted by the 
German navy, "Flotte 2005", is that its new vessels must be able 
to operate in crises all over the present NATO area of operations, 
and this capacity would make naval operations possible even 
outside this area.138 The same principle could be extended to other 
Northern European countries as well, or else Germany could 
divert the main part of its forces southwards, leaving the Baltic 
Sea area to the smaller countries. 
Even so, an arrangement that breaks the old ties across the 
Atlantic is not very likely to come true. In relations between 
Western Europe and North America the tendency towards 
economic competition is counteracted by old cultural and 
political ties, and a system in which the United States was 
engaged in fierce competition with Europe in the economic arena 
but cooperating with it in the field of security policy within the 
NATO organization could not last very long. Samuel Huntington 
argues in his new book that because of their shared values, such 
as individual liberty, America and Europe should bind 
themselves more closely to each other and stop jabbering about 
things like the "Pacific Century". Henry Kissinger writes that "It 
is among the established democracies that we should reinforce 
the values and institutions we treasure. The Western Hemisphere 
Economic Free Trade Area.... and its ultimate merging into an 
Atlantic Free Trade Area are crucial steps towards realizing these 
goals".139  Another reason for rejecting the APEC alternative is that 
there would be enormous difficulties in combining the interests 
of the United States and China. China practices highly 
protectionist policies and has territorial claims outstanding with 
almost all of its neighbours, apart from which its defence forces 
are the largest in the world. 
These facts lend credibility to the other bipolar alternative, 
continuation and strengthening of the Euro-Atlantic alliance. The 
present trend towards the extension of NATO in Europe also 
speaks for a strengthening of ties between Europe and America. 
The world's main line of division would then pass through the 
Eurasian continent, either between China and Russia or 
somewhere in the middle of the Asian Russia. India would 
probably be part of the western world. The Islamic countries 
might well form a separate group outside the major alliances and 
could take advantage of the situation by inclining towards the 
side that offers the more benefits in each particular case. In the 
extreme bipolar case suggested by Huntington, it would be the 
Christian West against the rest of the world. 
Within a large Atlantic alliance with Russia associated and 
the rival being located in the Far East, the problems experienced 
by Western Europe would not be as great as if APEC were fully 
implemented and Europe were left out. Consequently there 
would be less pressure for internal unification within the 
European Union and more space and need for subregional 
organizations than in the present situation even, because a vast 
alliance would be too diversified to be centrally governed. Britain 
together with some other countries could turn more towards 
America, Southern Europe to the Mediterranean area and 
Germany eastwards. In Northern Europe this might mean the 
emergence of an economic and political "New Hanseatic 
League". NATO could still exist, but its outlines in the Baltic Sea 
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area would be softened. A common organization with Russia 
would still not be very plausible, but a local and formally 
accepted Nordic military cooperation between Finland, Sweden, 
Denmark and maybe some other countries could be beneficial to 
stability. The United States and the European Union could agree 
upon a totally new kind of NATO, the tasks of which would 
mainly be situated outside the present area of operations. The 
demand for the small Northern European countries to participate 
in military operations in remote areas would not be as great as 
without U.S. participation. 
The third principal course of development would be a return 
to great power policies. If the detrimental effects of free trade 
were to prove unbearable for large parts of the population, the 
big investors were to miscalculate, the spread of crime and 
terrorism were to become uncontrollable or the rising power of 
China were to fail to adapt to the western system, then the liberal 
regime might be abandoned. This would lead to the resurrection 
of borders, protectionism and long-term mercantilistic policy in 
most countries. Large nations would once again have much more 
say in international relations than small ones. Great powers 
would compete with each other openly, or else they would find 
more or less lasting ways of achieving a new consensus. In both 
cases some features of the old geopolitics would return, such as 
clearly defined spheres of interest. 
This scenario is also consistent with the forecast by China's 
leadership that an era of economic competition will commence 
once the need of U.S. protection has diminished. The future 
world powers in the Chinese view will be the United States, 
Russia, China, Germany and Japan.140 In order to prevent 
domination, China is supporting independence of the EU to from 
the United States and an active role for Germany in Europe. 
China's position could be improved by a strategic alliance with 
Russia. In order to oppose Japanese or American supremacy, 
China wished to involve Russia in Asian-Pacific cooperation.14' 
There are thus already some new signs of old-fashioned power 
play and balance of power thinking. 
Theoretically, there could be other reasons for the resurgence 
of competition between states. If the free trade regime really did 
lead to the abandonment of nearly all restrictions between the 
large free trade areas, the regional free trade organizations and 
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agreements would become obsolete. Then the nearest political 
community available to protect the citizen would be the state, or 
some other subregional economic-political entity. An additional 
course for the return to national policies would be the 
observation that huge pan-areas are simply too large to govern. 
The reason for the successive retreats of Russia in the past is said 
to have been "overextension", and that for the present decline in 
the American presence all over the world "overcommitment". 
Governing a large empire is difficult in other respects, too. The 
"common interest" of a union can easily suppress the equally 
valuable "private interests" of individual nations or subregions. 
The larger the entity, the greater the issues that can be written off 
as "individual" and neglected. The common interest is mostly 
determined by the total economic growth to be expected, and 
local costs or other effects and interests are usually assigned a 
secondary role. As an example, the internal market philosophy 
of the EU and the removal of barriers to trade tend to override 
other social aspects. 
In the scenario of great power competition the state would 
also play a substantial role in the field of security policy. Overall 
responsibility for global and regional security would lie with 
international organizations such as the United Nations and the 
OSCE, which are not discriminatory. The success of regional 
cooperation in Northern Europe would depend heavily on the 
Russian decision as which of the three possible directions it 
would turn in. It is quite possible that the global competition 
between the great powers could strengthen its aspirations to 
restore its old empire, perhaps securing the Asian front by means 
of an alliance with China. For Northern Europe this would in 
principle signify a return to the times of the old geopolitics, with 
two local great powers, Russia and Germany, and a maritime 
one, the United States, dominating the picture. 
9 CONCLUSIONS 
It seems to be a common belief in the western democracies that 
the increasing interdependence between nations and the 
functions of the global economic forces will bring progress, 
spread welfare, demolish borders and remove the causes of 
conflicts. Liberalization of the movements of capital and 
elimination of the obstacles to trade are seen to be the means for 
achieving these goals. These actions are often seen as evoked by 
natural laws which cannot be resisted. 
This ideology that neglects political, ideological and cultural 
differences, or even aspires to annihilate them, is not an adequate 
guiding principle for governments which have to combat the 
negative aspects of free trade, above all the uneven and divergent 
patterns of geographical and social development. Citizens must 
be protected from internal and external threats by the states or 
other political organizations that hold responsibility within 
clearly defined borders. A universal society with equal rights and 
possibilities for everyone seems to be as utopistic an idea as ever, 
and market forces cannot be interested in bringing this about. In 
a harsh economic climate, spatially divided societies compete 
with each other in many ways, e.g. by offering more favourable 
terms for investors. The basis of geopolitical thinking, promotion 
of one's own interests within defined geographical boundaries, 
has not vanished. Competition between areas cannot be avoided. 
The patterns of development of geopolitical thinking and 
behaviour in all earlier great powers and empires have shown 
astonishing similarity, and there are reasons, grounded in present 
trends observable in some regions of the world, to believe that 
basically the same model will continue, even if the practical 
measures may be of a less perceptible kind. The arguments and 
motives expressed for deliberate internal unification or 
geographical expansion differ from case to case, but the direction 
of movement is the same. It has to be remembered, too, that the 
organizers of states in the past seldom had motives other than 
positive ones, like peace, prosperity, democracy and so on. In this 
respect the present justifications put forward for NATO and EU 
expansion sound very familiar. Behind peace and the securing of 
democratic development, genuine as they may be as aims, there 
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are always aspirations of improved competitiveness, access and 
influence. The International Institute for Strategic Studies 
maintains in its Strategic Survey 1996-1997 that western 
governments avoid interfering in mere humanitarian matters 
abroad; it is political and economic prospects that matter. 
The need for areal control and the protection of citizens from 
against external and internal menaces has been recognized in 
practice, and by way of a compromise a second belief is arisen, 
that the nation state is too small a unit to achieve competitiveness. 
On the other hand, the idea of large unions and pan-areas was 
not strange for the old geopolitical theoreticians either. It is just 
that the present trend is towards economic pan-areas of 
continental proportions. This 	still leaves the question 
unanswered of where the political responsibility for providing 
protection lies, at the union level or at that of its subunits, and 
from whom should the economic resources be collected and how 
should they be divided between very large areas. The 
concentration of production has to be counteracted by extensive 
subventions, which were seen as means of achieving 
competitiveness in the first place. There is no optimum or eternal 
size for a political community, and therefore one valid approach 
is to study different theoretical possibilities for a new world 
geopolitical system. Until now the state has been the exclusive 
geopolitical unit, but in the future there may also be smaller or 
larger entities. The more power is concentrated in the 
community, the more geopolitical character it is bound to take 
on. 
The most important new aspects in the world system are the 
passing of the former bipolar world, the slowly developing 
feeling of community between people in the democratic 
industrialized countries and the liberation of economic forces. 
These changes call for a new understanding of geopolitics and 
how it gains expression nowadays. It is important to reject ideas 
of the automatic, organistic growth of states and the determining 
influence of physical geography. Politics, economics and culture 
are the most important immediate forces that direct the shape of 
the geopolitical world order, while geography has an indirect 
impact through history, economic conditions and military 
considerations. Which of the forces is most influential, depends 
on the level of the system and the specific regional circumstances. 
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It is difficult to point to any one prevailing, largely accepted 
geopolitical theory, but every country has a more or less agreed 
geopolitical code or mental map as one of the tools of a policy 
that helps to determine its basic interests in the external world. 
With the world system in a transition phase, these codes and the 
associated self-images are still taking shape in many societies. In 
Russia, for example, neither the country's concrete geographical 
orientation nor its commonly accepted identity lie on very solid 
ground. In the United States there is a serious discussion going 
on about isolation, Asian-Pacific interests and old ties within the 
Atlantic Alliance. Paradoxically, if all the planned and sketched 
large free trade areas in the world were implemented, the United 
States would be the only power to participate in all of them. 
Logically, the present U.S. hegemony would only be enhanced 
by such a development. Consequently no definite future world 
system or corresponding geopolitical position for Northern 
Europe can be predicted with any certainty. As in earlier transit 
phases, several serious alternatives exist for the future system, 
and a faith in only one course would strike the analyst as being 
unfounded. 
The present situation in Northern Europe is influenced by 
the remnants of the bipolar world and the existing overall world 
system of a single hegemony. This affects the discussion over the 
extension of NATO as a military alliance providing protection to 
countries that feel themselvees threatened by Russia. Russia in 
turn wants to secure its influence over the neighbouring 
countries, and opposes any alliance founded against it that could 
expand eastwards. Geopolitically, the extension of NATO is in 
fact an action intended to prevent eventual Russian expansion, 
should that country one day rise from its present state of 
weakness, and an attempt to consolidate the western world. 
The situation would change if the world system were to 
develop towards fierce competition between economic blocs, 
with a growing political content. Just now economic forces on 
the global level seem to be the most influential ones, pushing the 
world towards three competing pan-areas. In each bloc the most 
influential branches of industry are preparing themselves for an 
intensification of competition against the corresponding 
industries in the other blocs. This tends to strengthen the political 
will to consolidate one's own resources by the same kind of 
methods that were used in empires of the old type. In this 
scenario the need for the United Nations and the OSCE and their 
significance might increase anew, and NATO would disappear 
or become little more than a peace-keeping organization. This in 
turn would intensify plans to organize the defence of the 
European Union within the WEU. The only real option for the 
Nordic Countries would then be full membership of this alliance, 
although a subregional organization would be beneficial for the 
purposes of stability. There could be pressure from the EU 
against the Nordic Countries taking part in operations outside 
Europe to defend the interests of the Union. 
Two other possible alternatives based on competition 
between pan-areas were also presented above, distinguished 
from each others mainly according to the point of the compass 
favoured by the United States. An inconsistent situation would 
be produced if the United States were to become engaged in a 
tight form of Asian-Pacific economic cooperation and at the same 
time consider its most important political and military partners 
to lie in Europe. In the extreme case it could find itself securing 
the border of NATO between China and Russia and at the same 
time promoting the economic interests of the APEC in the face of 
a European coalition on the other side of the same border. A more 
stable system would be created if the political, cultural and 
economic forces were to act in the same direction, that is to say, if 
the United States and Western Europe were united both within 
NATO and within a transatlantic free trade area. This latter view 
would give more space for subregional security arrangements. 
The last scenario presented here, a return to great power 
policies and competition between the states would come about if 
the present free trade regime were to fail to cope with its inherent 
sources of instability, or if a rising power could not adhere to the 
rules of others. This would return Northern Europe to the 
geopolitical model of the past, in which two local powers and a 
maritime one balance each other out and aim to extend their 
spheres of interest. 
Different geopolitical world orders demand their own 
approaches to Nordic security policy, but the degree of global 
competition and the prevailing general atmosphere also 
influence the situation. It should be noted that by comparison 
with the past the means of achieving geopolitical goals have often 
become "softer". If the present liberal free trade ideology gives 
way to a more protectionist one, however, geopolitical behaviour 
will revert earlier, more striking patterns. Cooperation in the 
Baltic region can in any case help to moderate the negative 
influences exerted on security by global economic and other 
forces, and this cooperation should also be formalized in the field 
of security policy. 
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